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ABSTRACT
A systematic method for the improvement of the safety and
reliability of automated guideway transit (AGT) vehicles via a
failure detection algorithm is developed. This algorithm is
based on the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) method which de-
tects failures by observing a departure of the vehicle system
from an idealized linear vehicle model.
The research explores the effect of model choice and complexity
and the use of dual-redundant sensors on key detection performance
issues.
Detection ability of vehicle failures is demonstrated by
vehicle simulations and experiments, and sensitivity to wind,
grade, and maneuvers is examined.
Detection methodology is developed for single AGT vehicles,
and is extended to AGT systems employing vehicle-follower
longitudinal control.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Public use of future automated guideway transit (AGT) systems [1] will
depend in part on the development of safe and reliable control systems.
The design of reliable failure detection and identification technology will
play a key role in reaching this goal.
Systems must be designed to accurately and rapidly detect and identify
failures which occur in AGT vehicles and their sub-systems. Such detection
systems are essential for high capacity systems since headways between
vehicles may be on the order of one-half second.
In this research study, a systematic methodology for AGT vehicle failure
detection employing a generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) approach will be
developed. This work will be centered on the design of a software algorithm
for digital processing of vehicle measurements.
A failure detection system which employs a generalized likelihood ratio
approach has many advantages over conventional methods (i.e., those relying
on comparisons of dual or triple redundant physical sensors). A GLR system
makes use of 'analytic redundancy', the known relationships between outputs
of unlike sensors. This use of analytic vs. physical redundancy can sig-
nificantly reduce hardware costs since fewer sensors are required with this
approach. In addition, a system based on analytic redundancy is less
likely to miss the detection of generic sensor failures (for example, a
temperature change similarly affecting all like sensors in a physically
redundant set).
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An added bonus of the use of the GLR approach is that during unfailed
operation, optimal estimates of vehicle states (i.e., optimally filtered
measurements) are readily available to the control system for use in control
law calculations. Finally, a GLR based detection system can permit a 'fail-
operational' response (continued vehicle operation) to certain types of
vehicle failures, since estimates of failure location, type, and magnitude
can be determined by the algorithm and made available to the control system
for compensation.
1.1 Background
Much work has appeared on the design of real-time AGT control systems
[2-27]. Most notably, the design of vehicle-follower type longitudinal
control systems appears to permit stable control of closely packed strings of
vehicles. The successful implementation of a vehicle-follower control
strategy depends on accurate knowledge of vehicle and neighboring vehicle
states and the availability of a responsive propulsion system. Undetected
faults in propulsion or in the sensors providing measurements of vehicle
states to the control system will certainly cause problems, and may lead to
collisions.
In this light, relatively little has appeared on the systematic develop-
ment of methodologies for the detection of and response to vehicle failures.
One report which has recently appeared, however, is the work of Vander Velde
at M.I.T. [28]. Vander Velde employs a failure detection filter approach,
developed by Beard [29] and Jones [30]. The detection filter incorporates a
-15-
linear system model specifying nominal system behavior (Figure 1.1). Any
deviation from nominal behavior of the system, due to an actuator failure,
a sensor failure, or a significant change in some parameter describing the
system, will result in a discrepancy between the observations of the actual
system and the outputs, or predictions, of the model. This difference is
often called the error, e(t), or the residual signal vector. The detection
filter uses the system model with a feedback gain matrix D which not only
makes the filter stable, but in the presence of a failure, holds the error
signal vector e(t) to be uni-directional. The direction of e(t) indicates an
element which has failed. Thus elements of e(t) are compared to fixed
thresholds to declare the occurrance of various failures.
The detection filter approach has many advantages over other failure
detection strategies, most notably its simplicity in terms of required on-
line computations. In addition, the filter design does not require a-priori
specification of vehicle component failure modes, i.e., the way in which
components will fail. However, the detection filter technique has a number
of limitations:
(1) It is sometimes not possible to design detection filters in
such a way that sensor failures can be unambiguously
identified.
(2) More than one detection filter is usually required to
detect failures in all the components for which
failure detection is desired. Choosing the failures
to be associated with each filter still remains an
ad hoc procedure.
-16-
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Figure 1.1 - Detection Filter Block Diagram [28]
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(3) The detection filter can only declare that a failure has
occurred in a given component. It is unable to
determine or estimate the type of failure or the extent
(magnitude) of the failure. Thus failure compen-
sation by the control system cannot be done unless
all components appear in dual-redundant pairs, in
which case the faulty component is completely removed
from operation.
The generalized likelihood ratio method for failure detection is not as
simple to implement as the detection filter. Whereas the detection filter
algorithm simply compares the residual at a single instant of time to a
threshold, the GLR algorithm examines the entire trajectory over a period of
time of the residual. However, the added complexity of the GLR algorithm
results in a highly sophisticated failure detection and identification
system.
-18-
CHAPTER II
AN IDEALIZED AGT VEHICLE MODEL
2.1 Introduction
A key component of a failure detection system based on the generalized
likelihood ratio method is a simplified, linear model of the AGT vehicle.
Failures of vehicle components will be detected in real-time by observing
and analyzing sudden discrepancies between the idealized model and the actual
AGT vehicle.
In order to illustrate the GLR methodology, we will present a simple
model of an AGT vehicle, and will show how the GLR algorithm would be
developed for the vehicle based on the model.
2.2 Vehicle Description
A block diagram of a typical AGT vehicle which was used in this study
is shown in Figure 2.1. A wayside computer transmits control commands to
the vehicle via a communication link. The control commands are processed
by an on-board control computer which translates these commands into an ap-
propriate motor voltage command, E . The voltage command is amplified by a
power conditioning unit (PCU), which applies a voltage E to a DC traction
motor. The PCU will be referred to as the voltage actuator. The PCU, DC
motor and the vehicle drive train will be referred to as the propulsion
system.
On board the vehicle also exists a set of sensors. These sensors measure
the vehicle's position and velocity. We will assume that these two sensors
-19-
IFigure 2.1 - AGT Vehicle Block Diagram
Iw
are independent devices. The outputs of the sensors are used as feedback
signals by the on-board control computer. The sensor outputs are also
transmitted back to the wayside computer.
2.3 Control System
The on-board control computer consists of two components: a velocity
command generator and a velocity regulator. The velocity command generator
doubly integrates jerk commands sent to the vehicle from the wayside computer.
Jerk is used as the control input so that vehicle jerk and acceleration can
be constrained within service limits for passenger ride comfort. The wayside
computer can thus control the vehicle's line speed by transmitting a jerk
profile to the vehicle. A jerk profile which would command the vehicle to
increase its line speed by 3 m/s is shown in Figure 2.2. The velocity com-
mand computed by the velocity command generator is fed to the velocity
regulator. The velocity regulator's function is to compute a motor voltage
command which will keep the vehicle at the commanded velocity. The velocity
regulator chosen for this study was developed in [26]. This regulator is
shown in Figure 2.3.
2.4 Vehicle Dynamics
The dynamics of the AGT vehicle and its DC motor are modelled by Pitts
[19]. A block diagram for this model is shown in Figure 2.4. Parameter
values for a typical personal rapid transit AGT vehicle are given in
Table 2.1. Pitts' model includes the effects of guideway grade and non-linear
aerodynamic drag forces. Drag force can be linearized around a nominal
-21-
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Figure 2.3 - Velocity Command Generator and Velocity Regulator
w w w
JERK
COMMAND
tJ(A
DC TRACTION MOTOR
VEHICLE KINEMATICS
GRADE FORCE AERODYNAMIC DRAG
Figure 2.4
Non-Linear AGT Vehicle and DC Motor Block Diagram; Pitts [191
TABLE 2.1
AGT VEHICLE AND MOTOR PARAMETERS
Represented is a 4-6 passenger personal rapid tra
by a 60 hp. DC traction motor.
Parameter
Motor Torque Constant
Motor Back emf Constant
Armature Inductance
Armature Resistance
Motor Shaft Inertia
Vehicle Wheel Radius
Gear Ratio
Vehicle Mass
Motor Viscous Friction
Vehicle Wheel Inertia
Total Rotational Inertia
Drag Coefficient
Vehicle Frontal Area
Air Density
Linearized Drag
Symbol
K
T
K
B
L
R
J
r
w
n
M
K
V
L
J
T
CD
A
P
WD
nsit (PRT) vehicle propelled
Nominal Value
.827 N-M/A
.88 V/RAD-S
.00052 H
,0203 ohms
,461 Kg-M 2
.35 M
3.82
979 Kg.
~0
~0
28.679 Kg-M
,7
3,4 M 2
1.22
9.67 x 10-4
no wind, 15m/s veh. velocity
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wind and vehicle velocity, with the resulting linear model shown in
Figure 2.5. This model can be transformed via a change of variables into
phase-variable cannonical form (so that the integrator states are position,
velocity, and acceleration) and is shown in Figure 2.6. The details of the
model transformation are given in [19]. The transfer function from motor
voltage to velocity can be shown to be [19]:
V(s) KM
E(s) 2
s +C0 s+CO
The constants KM, C0 , and C1 depend on the characteristics of the vehicle
and the DC motor, the load, and the nominal wind and vehicle velocities.
Typical values of these parameters are given in Table 2.2.
The transformed, linear vehicle model can be written in state-space
form as:
x~) 0 1 0 x (t) 0 0
[0j) =[0 0 1 v(t) + 0 E(t) + 0 (2.1)
[a t) L0 -C -C 0 a(t) .K ., (t)-
where x(t), v(t), and a(t) are the position, velocity, and acceleration
state variables, and E(t) is the voltage applied to the motor.
Position and velocity measurements, x (t) and v (t), are represented
m m
via:
-26--
vE
3Sst
gmade
Figure 2.5
Linear Vehicle and DC Motor Block Diagram; Pitts [19]
mr
COC
Figure 2.6
Transformed, Linear Vehicle and DC Motor Block Diagram; Pitts [19]
MASS(Kg) 663 979 1295
Km (m/S3 Volt) 24.18 16.79 12.86
C0 (3-) 234.84 162.98 124.78
C1 (S1) 39.10 39.08 39.07
Table 2.2
Transformed Vehicle Model Parameters [26]
IMF
EMPTY VEHICLE NOMINAL VEHICLE FULL VEHICLE
I
(2-2)
vL0 1 0 ] v(t)n
a (t)
We will refer to (2-1) as the vehicle state equation and (2-2) as the
measurement equation.
The effects of external disturbances (i.e., wind, grade) and modelling
errors are included in the vehicle state equation via the plant noise
process W(t). These modelling errors are the errors made by representing
the complex dynamics of the actual AGT vehicle with a simplified linear
model. The errors are due in part to the linearization of the drag force,
the assumptions made about the vehicle's propulsion system and load in the
choice of K , C 0 , and C , and the effects of unmodelled dynamics such as
rolling friction, bearing loss, and slippage.
The measurement noise vector n(t) represents the difference between the
vehicle's actual position and velocity and the measured values.
A block diagram of the vehicle model given by equations (2-1) and (2-2)
is shown in Figure 2.7.
2.5 Discrete Equivalent of the Continuous-Time Model
The continuous-time vehicle model equations (2-1) and (2-2) represent
the behavior of the vehicle at all time instants t. An equivalent discrete-
time representation can be developed [31] which characterizes the vehicle
behavior by quantities defined at equally spaced, discrete instants of time
-30-
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Figure 2.7
Vehicle Block Diagram (Sensor and Plant Noise Incl.)
kAt, k=0,1,..., where the time period At is called the sampling interval
and 1/At is the sampling rate. The discrete-time vehicle model, required
for the implementation of the GLR algorithm in a digital computer, will be
of the following form:
x(k+l) = 4x(k) + Bu(k) + w(k) (2-3)
z (k) = Cx (k) + n (k) (2-4)
T
with state vector x(k) = [x (k) , v (k) , a (k) ] , measurement vector
z(k) = [xm(k), vm (k) ] and control input u (k) = E (k). The discrete-time
plant noise and sensor noise processes w(k) and n(k) are modelled to be
statistically equivalent to the continuous-time processes W (t) and n (t) .
The details of the transformation from continuous-time to discrete-time
are presented in Appendix B.
One significant difference between the continuous-time and discrete-
time state equations is that the discrete-time model assumes that the
control input u(k) is piece-wise constant over the sampling interval (eg.,
using a zero-order hold). The actual control, u(t), applied to the vehicle
plant, however, may be a continuous signal. The effects of this assumption
on the detection system is discussed in section 4.3.5.
2.6 Vehicle Failure Detection
It is essential that accurate knowledge of vehicle states is available
to the control system. It is also essential that the vehicle's propulsion
system be able to respond effectively to the control system's commands.
-32-
Both the sensor and propulsion systems are critical to the safety of the
vehicle. Sudden failures of these systems have the potential to create
disasterous results. It is desirable to provide a system to detect and
respond to such vehicle component failures.
A failure detection system must have the ability to detect safety
threatening failures with high probability. However, in order to minimize
unnecessary delays, the systems must have a small probability of signalling
alarms when no failure has occurred. Un-modelled external forces such as
wind and guideway grades are likely to cause such false alarms.
The failure detection method to be presented in this report operates
by comparing observations from sensors with what those observations are
expected to be based on predictions from the discrete-time vehicle model.
Failures will cause the predicted and actual observations to behave sig--
nificantly different. Simplistically, the strategy is similar to failure
detection via a dual redundant set of sensors; failures are detected when
the sensor outputs differ. Analogously, the vehicle model will serve as
half of the redundant pair.
To determine how the modelled observations will differ from the actual
observations in the event of a failure, simple failure models will be de-
veloped for components of the vehicle. The components which will be examined
are sensors, which measure vehicle states (eg., position and velocity), and
actuators which implement control commands (eg., the propulsion system).
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2.7 Sensor/Actuator Failure Models
Sensors and actuators can both be modelled by the simple block diagram
below:
--------- i DEV IC E
INPUT I OUTPUT
The input to a sensor is a state to be measured (e.g., the vehicle's actual
velocity), and the output is a measurement of that state. The input to an
actuator is a control signal,and its output is an appropriate action neces-
sary to implement the control (eg., the application of a force or voltage).
Noise is assumed to be always present in the sensor or actuator, and represents
the difference between the actual state and its quantified measurement, or
the difference between the desired control and the control action actually
implemented by the actuator.
Failures in sensors and actuators can both be modelled in similar fashions.
We have compiled a list of possible failure types or modes which are likely
to occur in these devices:
1) Additive Bias - the output of the device is
continually offset by a constant level.
2) Jump - the output of the device is momentarily
offset by a constant level, eg., the occurrence
of a brief disturbance such as a sudden noise
spike or "glitch".
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3) Scale Factor Change - the gain of the device has
changed such that the output is in error by a
constant percentage.
4) Zero Output - the output remains at the lowest
or "zero" level.
5) Hard-Over - the output remains at the highest
or maximum level.
6) Stuck - the output remains at an intermediate level.
A block diagram of. the device which can be used to model these failures
is shown in Figure 2.8.
The input/output relationships for these sensor or actuator failures
are shown in Figure 2.9. A hypothetical output trajectory is shown in
Figure 2.10a for an unfailed device. The output which would be obtained if
a failure had occurred at time 0 is shown in Figure 2.10b-g.
The effect of these failures on the failed device outputs shown in
Figure 2.10b-g is similar in that there occurs a sudden departure of the
output from its expected behavior. The similarity between the failed output
trajectories is especially apparent when the state, x(t), or the control,
u(t), remain constant over a time interval, as is the case immediately fol-
lowing the failure in the hypothetical examples of Figure 2.10. This will
always be the case when the dynamics of the system are relatively slow com-
pared to the sampling rate of the control and detection systems, as in an
AGT vehicle.
The similarity of the various failure modes to additive bias failures will
be employed in the development of the detection algorithm, as failures modelled-
as biases have special properties which can be utilized.
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, a mathematical model of an AGT vehicle has been
presented which will be used in developing a methodology for failure detection
based on the generalized likelihood ratio method. Models of various failure
modes have been developed. An important feature of these failure modes is
that under certain conditions they can be modelled in a similar fashion, i.e.,
as additive biases. In the following chapter, we show how this approach to
modelling failure modes can be exploited to develop a computer-based algorithmic
procedure for detecting when a failure has occurred.
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CHAPTER III
THE GLR APPROACH FOR FAILURE DETECTION
3.1 Introduction
The generalized likelihood ratio method for event detection in linear
dynamic systems was developed by Willsky and Jones [32,33]. The generalized
likelihood ratio is an easily implemented software algorithm. It processes
data in real-time to detect the occurrance of sudden departures of a real
system from a simple idealized linear model. The technique has successfully
been applied to a wide variety of complex systems, such as for failure detec-
tion in aircraft systems [341, detection of incidents on freeways [35], and
detection of cardiac arrythmias [36]. The GLR method has been shown to be a
flexible and systematic approach, capable of detecting and identifying numerous
types of failures and events.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the entire GLR algorithm consists of three main
components: I) a Kalman-Bucy Filter, II) a correlator, and III) a decision
rule. A linear model of the vehicle is embedded in a Kalman-Bucy filter [37].
Predictions of vehicle states generated by the model are compared to actual
measurements from the vehicle's sensors; the difference between the two is
called the residual. When a vehicle failure occurs, the residuals will have a
unique behavior, or signature, depending on the type of failure. In the GLR
calculations, the residuals are compared, or correlated, to each member of a
precomputed set of signatures. The resulting likelihood ratios are measures of
the correlation to each of the failure signatures. These likelihood ratios
are then used in a decision rule to determine whether a failure has occurred,
and if so, to decide among the possible failure types.
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The details of the GLR algorithm will now be presented.
3.2 System Model
The GLR method assumes a discrete-time state space description of a linear
dynamical systems(*) described by:
State equation:
x(k+l) = x(k) + Bu(k) + w(k) (3-1)
Measurement equation:
z(k) = Cx(k) + n(k) (3-2)
Here x is the state vector and u is a known control input; _w and n are
modelled as independent, zero mean, uncorrelated Gaussian random sequences
with covariances:
T
E[w(j) w (k)] = Q j=k
f 0  jfk
E[n(j) n (k)] = R j=k
0 jfk
In section 4.2.1 more will be said about the modelling of these noise
processes.
3.3 Kalman-Bucy Filter
A Kalman-Bucy filter [37] is designed for the system model (3-1 ) and
(3-2). The filter is given by:
We will restrict our attention to time-invariant systems, although extension
to the time-varying case is easily done.
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Predicted State Estimate:
x(klk-1) = @x(k-lk-l) + Bu(k-l) (3-3)
Residual:
y(k) = z(k) - Cx(kIk--1) (3-4)
Updated State Estimate:
x(kjk) = x(k k-1) + Ky (k) (3-5)
where x(kl j) is the estimate of the state x(k) given the measurements
z (O) , z(l) z_(j). With Gaussian disturbances w and n, X(k k) is the
optimal minimum mean squared error state estimate. The process y(k) is
called the residual or innovations. sequence, and will be a zero mean,
uncorrelated, Gaussian process when no failure has occurred. For time-
invariant systems, the optimal steady-state gain K is computed by solving
the discrete algebraic matrix Riccati equation for the steady-state error
covariance of x(klk-1), I
p
- + T+ Q- C [C C + RI C p (3-6)
p p p p
Then the error covariance of x(kjk) is given by:
-P C T[C CT + R~1 C - (3-7)
and the Kalman gain K can then be found:
K = 1CT R- (3-8)
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The steady-state covariance V of the residual is given by:
V = CY C + R (3-9)
3.4 Failure Signatures
3.4.1 Modelling of Failures
Failures in the system's actuators or sensors can be modelled by the
addition of two failure vectors, f and f , to the system model (3-1),
-D --s
(3-2) as follows:
x(k+l) - x(k) + Bu(k) + w (k) + f (k+1,0) (3-10)
z(k) = Cx(k) + n(k) + f (k,O) (3-11)
-s
The vector f (k,O) represents the effect (on the system dynamics) at time k
of an actuator failure which occurred at time 0. The vector f (k,8)
-S
similarly represents sensor failures. The failures discussed in section 2.7
can be modelled by appropriate specification of f and f . These specifica-
tions are shown in Table 3.1. Biases are modelled by the addition of a
constant vector, V, to the state or measurement equation. For example, assume
that the measurement equation (3-11) represents two independent sensor
measurements. A bias of size S to the first sensor is represented by the
choice.
f [(3-12)
-s- 01
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TABLE 3.1
FAILURE VECTOR SPECIFICATION; MODELLING OF FAILURES MODES
FAILURE MODE
Actuator Bias
Sensor Bias
Actuator Jump
(State Jump)
Sensor Jump
Actuator Scale factor
change, zero output
Sensor Scale Factor
change, zero output
Hard-over Actuator
Stuck Actuator
SPECIFICATION
f (k+l,e)
f (k,G) =
f (k+1,O) =
0
f (k,6)
f (k+l,O) =
f (k,Q) =
f (k+1,0) =
ABu(k)
0
ACx(k)
0
k+1>6
k+1<8
k=8
k+1=0
k+13/e
k=8
k7 6
k+1>
k+1<3
k>9
K< 9
{ABu (k)+ v
0
ACx(k)+V
Hard-over Sensor,
Stuck Sensor
f (ke)
k+l>0
k+l<0
k>O
k<8
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0
and a bias in the second sensor by
f = V = [1 (3-13)
--s -1
We say that the vector [ or [ represent the locations (i.e., the first
or second sensor) or direction (i.e. direction in state-space) of the failure,
and that the size of the scalar (i.e., the size of the bias) is the magnitude
of the failure.
Jump failures are modelled in a similar fashion as biases, except for
the fact that the additive constant vector V appears only for a single time
step.
Scale factor change failures are modelled by a change in one or more of
the elements of the B or C matrices. Zero output failures are actually a
subset of scale factor change failures. They are modelled by a change (to zero)
in elements of the B or C matrices. Hard-over and stuck device failures are
modelled by a scale factor change to zero in the gain matrices B or C, and
the addition of a constant value representing the maximum or stuck value of
the failed device's output.
3.4.2 Effects of Failures
Failures in the physical system will have a noticeable effect on the
Kalman-Bucy filter; the predicted observations generated by the system model
will begin to differ from the actual observations from the sensor. The dif-
ference between the two will appear in the residual sequence y(k). When no
failure has occurred, the mean of the residual will be zero; if a failure has
occurred, the residual will no longer be zero mean but will behave in a manner
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characteristic of the failure. This behavior will be exploited to detect the
failures.
The effect that one of the above failure types will have on the Kalman-
Bucy filter (3-3)-(3-5) can be computed. Since the system model and the
filter are linear, the state estimates and the residuals can each be decomposed
into two sequences:
x(kjk) = (kjk) + 2 (k) (3-14)
y(k) y  (k) + y2 (k) (3-15)
where x 1(klk) and y 1 (k) are the state estimates and residuals, respectively,
which would have appeared if the failure had not occurred. The effect of the
failure is given by "2 (k) and Y 2 (k). The sequence 2 (k) can be computed from
one of the following recursive relations:
ACTUATOR FAILURES:
2 (k) = (I-KC) x (k-1) + KCf (k, ) (3-16)
-2 -2
or,
SENSOR FAILURES:
x (k) = (I-KC)@x (k-l) + Kf (k,O)
-2 -2 -s
with
x (k) H O for k<O (3-17)
-2
The sequence y2(k), the effect of the failure on the residuals, is then
given by:
-47-
ACTUATOR FAILURES:
12(k) = Cf (k,O) - Cx (k-1) (3-18)
D -2
or
SENSOR FAILURES:
12(k) = f S(k,6) - Cx2 (k-i) (3-19)
After the occurrence of a failure at some unknown time e, the residual
process y(k) will no longer be a zero mean sequence; its mean will now be
yj 2 (k).
The sequence Y 2 (k) is called the failure signature; it is the "unique"
effect of a failure on the residuals. Can we somehow use (3-16)-(3-19) to
determine a-priori the behavior of the signature for various failures, so
that by looking for the signature in the residuals the failure can be
detected? By a re-examination of the failure vector specifications in Table
3.1 we can conclude that the answer in some cases is "yes".
Notice that the failure specifications for bias and jump failures are not
state-dependent or control-dependent; the specifications do not depend on the
knowledge of x(k) or u(k). We can thus use (3-16)-(3-19) and the linearity
of the filter to write:
2(k) = G(k,O)V (3-20)
where G(k,0) is a set of precomputable matrices called the failure signature
matrices [38,39). The matrices G(k,0) will depend on the type of failure
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(i.e., sensor/actuator, bias/jump) but are independent of the unknown
a-priori direction or magnitude of the failure vector V.
Unfortunately, the failure specifications (Table 3.1) for the failure
types other than biases and jumps are state or control-dependent; their
failure signatures will behave differently for different state or control
trajectories, which are unknown a-priori. Thus their failure signatures can
not be precomputed. However, as we have discussed in section 2.7, these
failure types appear similar to bias failures, especially when the state or
control remains relatively constant over a detection interval. We will thus
develop a detection methodology which is designed to detect solely additive
bias failures; we will show via experiments that the detection system can
detect the other failure types as well.
The detection of jump failures can be performed in a manner parallel to
the methodology to be presented for the detection of bias failures. We have
chosen to limit ourselves to bias failures, however, since failures which
persist over time are likely to have the worst effects on AGT vehicle safety.
Development of failure signatures for jump failures can be found in [38] and
[39).
3.5 Detection of Failures
3.5.1 Hypothesis Testing
The problem of detecting a failure can now be reduced to the problem
of deciding between different hypotheses:
-49-
H : the residuals are zero mean (no failure)
Hi: the residuals are not zero mean (a failure has occurred
in location i)
Since failures in different locations in the system have characteristic
effects on the residuals, the above hypotheses can be re-written as follows:
H y(k) =y (k) (no failures)0 -- l
H.: X(k) = y (k) + G(k,6)f.3 (failure of magnitude S in
direction f.)
Here we have constrained the failure vector V\=f. to lie in a finite set
of directions {f.} in either state-space (actuator failures) or output-
space (sensor failures) [38,39]. Each of these directions correspond to an
individual sensor or actuator in the system. G(k,G) is either the state
bias or sensor bias signature matrix, depending whether the failure direction
vector f represents an actuator or a sensor.
3.5.2 Likelihood Ratio Tests
The hypothesis testing problem can be reduced to the construction of a
likelihood ratio test [31]. A likelihood ratio for each hypothesis is given
by:
p(y(l),...,y(k) H., ,)
(k) = ~~()ykj)(3-22)
L. (k) is a random variable having a different mean under each hypothesis.
It can thus be used in a decision rule, such as comparing it to a threshold,
to decide among the hypothesis.
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For each hypothesis i, the maximum likelihood estimates [31] of the
failure time 0 and the failure magnitude S can be computed. They are the
values which maximize the probability density function for the residuals con-
ditioned on the occurrence of a failure in direction i, i.e.,
$.(k), S.(k) = arg max p(y (1),...,y(k) H. , =0, B=B) (3-23)
The maximum likelihood ratio (MLR) for each hypothesis to be used in the
decision rule is then given by:
L.(k --p(Y(1), ... ,1(k) 1H. O=e. (k), S=$ (k)) (-4L.(k) =1(3-24)i p(Y(1),..., (k)I H0
3.6 Maximum Likelihood Ratio Computation
Since the residuals have the multivariate Gaussian density, we can take
the logarithm of the likelihood ratios, obtaining:
k T
2. (k) = 2kn L. (k) = k - (j)V Y(j (3-25)
1=1
k ]T -l ]T
- y (j)-G(j V [y(j)-G(j,0. (k))f.. (k)]
1111-
j=1
By differentiating with respect to . (k), setting the result to zero, and
solving for f (k), we can express . (k) as an explicit function of $ (k):
b. (k;0 . (k))
.(k) = 1 1 (3-26)
a. (k;0. (k))
1 1
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with
b.(k; f) = (k,
f- -~k) (3-27)
k k T T -l
= f. G (j,e)V y(j)
j=1
k
T
s . (j,O)Y(j)
j=1
and
T
a. (k,O) = f. C(k,6)f.
1-21 -1 (3-28)
k
k T T -l
= f. G (jO)V G(jO)f.
j=1
The scalars a. (k;O) are a precomputable, determ, inistic sequence. The scalar
b (k,O) are linear combinations of the residuals, which represent a correlation
or matched filter [31] operation between the failure signatures and the
residuals. The sequence s.(j,O), used in the computation of b.(k,e), is the
failure signature G(j,e)f which would appear in the residuals weighted by
-l
V , the inverse of the residual covariance matrix. We will thus refer to
s. (j,6) as the weighted failure signature. The weighting process has the ef-
fect of giving more attention to elements of the residual which are expected
to contain the least amount of background noise.
The likelihood ratio can now be written as:
2
b. (k,O)
k. (k;O) = 3 (3-29)
a.(k,e)
1
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The maximum likelihood estimate $. (k) is the value of 0<k which maximizes
(3-29). Then the maximum likelihood ratio (MLR) for a failure in direction
f. is given by
(k) (k; O.(k)) (3-30)
3.7 Decision Rule
The maximum likelihood ratios V*, each representing the likelihood of a
failure in the sensor or actuator represented by f., can be used in a decision
rule to decide 1) if a failure has occurred, and 2) if so, in which sensor
or actuator.
A possible decision rule is to compare the largest maximum likelihood
ratio to a threshold as follows:
NO FAILURE
max (3-31)
i FAILURE
The estimated location of the failure is found by choosing the i which
maximized , i.e.,
1 = arg max (3-32)
i 1
The location of the failure is then given by f
The threshold 6 can be chosen to maximize the tradeoff between the
false alarm and missed detection probabilities.
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3.8 Information Measures
The scalars b. (k;6), equation (3-27), have been given intuitive meaning;
they represent the amount of "match" between the signatures and the residuals.
However, we have yet to comment on the set a. (k;O), equation (3-28). These
scalars are derived from the matrices C(k;0), which are called the "information
matrices". (An insightful analysis of the information matrices can be found in
[39].) Intuitively, a. (k;O) measures the information available in the re-
siduals at time k from a failure of direction f. which occurred at time 0.
For this reason we shall coin the name "information measure" to refer to
a. (k;0). In essence, the information measures can be thought of as a signal to
noise ratio, measuring the ratio of energy in the biased part of the residual
sequence (assuming a bias is present) to the energy in the background noise.
The information measures a. (k;O) can provide insight into the behavior of
1
the likelihood ratios following the occurrence of a failure. When no failure
has occurred, the likelihood ratios are chi-squared random variables with mean
one. After occurrence of a bias failure at time 6 of magnitude in direction
f., the likelihood ratios t. (k;0) are non-central chi-squared random variables
with mean given by:
2
E[. (k;)= 1 + 2a .(k;0) (3-33a)
and variance:
Var[Z. (k;O)] = 2 + 4 2a. (k;O) (3-33b)
A failure, therefore, has the effect of moving the mean of the likelihood
ratios away from one, as shown in Figure 3.2.
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The relative ease with which a bias failure can be detected thus depends
on the magnitude of the bias, r, and the behavior of the information measures;
the farther apart the means of the distributions are, the higher the proba-
bility the failure will be detected.
3.9 Simplifications
3.9.1 Time Invariance
Since the system (3-1), (3-2) is assumed time invariant, the failure
signatures are functions of
r k- (3.34)
i.e., the time since the occurrence of the failure. Thus, at each time
step k, the following set of k correlations are computed
r
ST
b. (1,r) = s. (j) (k-r+j) for r=O to k-1 (3-35)
with
T T T -l
s. (j) = f. G (j)V (3-36)
the weighted failure signature. At each time step k we are thus hypothesizing
the possible occurrence of a failure for every time 0 between 1 and k inclusive.
We are in essence "sliding" the failure signatures across the residuals
y(l),...,Y(k), correlating it with the residuals at each step along the way
(Figure 3. 3) ,
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0
K
3.9.2 Detection Window
As k increases, however, so does the number of possible values of 0.
Thus implementation of the above scheme involves a growing number of cor-
relation or matched filter computations at each step, and we need the entire
precomputed signature s (r) , r=O,.. .,k-l. Willsky and Jones [32, 33] suggest,
as a solution to this problem, limiting the maximization over 0 to a finite
window k-M < 0 < k-N. The assumptions made in the use of this simplification
are that no decision can be made with less than N+l observations, and that
failures which occurred before time k-M should have already been detected.
With the use of this detection "window", the signature, s(r) , need be
precomputed for N < r < M.
The set a. (k;0) is also a function of r = k - 0 only. The shape of the
curve a. (r), r=O,..., can provide information useful to the determination of
an appropriate detection window. For example, the number of steps until
convergence of a. (r) to a steady-state value is a useful indicator for the
length of the window to be chosen, for additional observations will provide no
additional information about a failure in direction f. . Failures for which
-
a. (r) do not reach steady-state values imply that these failures, no matter
1
how small the magnitude may be, will eventually be detected given a long
enough detection window, since more information about the failure is obtained
at each succeeding step.
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3.10 GLR Algorithm Summary
A summary of the steps required for the implementation of the GLR
algorithm is provided below. The steps are divided into those done a-priori
and those performed during on-line operation of the algorithm (Figure 3.4).
I. Pre-Computable Calculations
1) System Model [Sec. 3.2, equations (3-1)-(3-2))
Determine a linear, discrete-time state-space system
model:
x(k+l) = Cx(k) + Bu(k) + wg(k)
with measurements
z(k) = Cx(k) + n(k)
Choose plant and sensor noise covariance matrices
Q and R.
2) Kalman-Bucy Filter [Sec. 3.3, equations (3-6) - (3-9)]
Solve the discrete algebraic matrix Riccati equation for
the predicted error covariance matrix E .
p
Compute the updated error covariance matrix E.
Compute the Kalman gain matrix K.
Compute the residual covariance matrix V and
-1
its inverse V .
3) Detection Window [Sec. 3.9.2]
Choose the detection window parameters O<N<M such that
the search for failures will be done in the interval
k - M < 0 < k-N
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Figure 3.4 - GLR Algorithm Steps
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4) Failure Direction Vectors [Sec. 3.5.1]
Determine the set {f .} of failure direction vectors.
Each vector will correspond to a sensor or actuator for
which failure detection is to be performed.
5) Failure Signature Matrices [Sec. 3.4.2, references 38,39]
Compute the set of actuator and/or sensor failure
signature matrices G(r) r=O,...,M.
6) Weighted Failure Signatures [Sec. 3.6, equations (3-27), (3-36)]
Compute the weighted set of failure signatures s. (r)
r=N,. .. ,M for each failure direction f..
7) Information Matrices [equations (3-28), references 38,39]
Compute the set of actuator and/or sensor failure infor-
mation matrices C(r) r=N,.. ,M.
8) Information Measures [Sec. 3.6, 3.8, equation (3-28))
Compute the set of information measures a (r) r=N,. . .,M
for each failure direction f
II. On-line Processing
The following steps are performed at each step k during the
on-line operation of the failure detection system.
9) Kalman-Bucy Filter Update [Sec. 3.3, equations (3-3)-(3-5)]
Compute the predicted state estimate x(kjk-1).
Compute the residual y(k). The residuals
y(k) , .-. ,y(k-M) are kept in storage.
Compute the updated state estimate x(kjk).
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10) Failure Signature Correlations [Sec. 3.6, 3.9.1, equations
(3-27) , (3-35)]
"Slide" the failure signatures s . (r) through the
detection window, computing the correlations b. (r)
at each step r=N,.. . ,M.
11) Likelihood Ratio Functions [Sec. 3.6, equation (3-29)]
Compute the likelihood ratios A .(r) r=N,.. . ,M for each
possible failure time in the detection window and for each
failure direction f..
12) Maximum Likelihood Ratios [Sec. 3.6, equation (3-30]
Choose the maximum (over the detection window) likelihood
ratio Z for each failure direction.
13) Decision Rule [Sec. 3.7, equations (3-31), (3-32)]
Use the maximum likelihood ratios A in a decision rule
to decide if a failure has occurred, and if so, its
location. If no failure, return to step 9.
Example decision rule: Choose the maximum k* of the
set 5T. Compare to a threshold S to decide if a
failure has occurred.
14) Failure Time Estimate [Sec. 3.61
Choose r which maximized k^ (r) . The maximum likelihood
estimate of the failure time is e = k - r.
15) Failure Magnitude Estimate [Sec. 3.6, equation (3-26)]
Compute the maximum likelihood estimate of the failure
magnitude S = be r)/ a^(r).
1 1
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CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION OF THE GLR METHOD TO THE AGT VEHICLE
4.1 Introduction
The GLR algorithm will be illustrated by applying the method to the AGT
vehicle failure detection problem described in chapter two. We will present
the results of computer experiments testing the algorithms' performance in
detecting sensor and propulsion system failures which can be modelled as biases.
The effects of non-failure external disturbances such as noise, maneuvers,
wind and grade on the algorithm will also be evaluated.
A number of important performance issues are to be examined via the examples
presented in this chapter, Tradeoffs exist among the following performance
indices:
1) Detection probability
2) False alarm probability
3) Time to detect
4) Probability of correct failure location identification
With the GLR algorithm as a foundation, systematic performance tradeoffs
are possible; the principal design variables include:
1) System model- Increasing model complexity can result in improved
detection algorithm performance, often at the cost of increased
sensitivity to disturbances and un-modelled effects, leading to
higher false alarm rates. Simplified models, on the other hand,
may be unable to detect certain failures altogether.
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2) Sensor configurations- Physically redundant sensors will improve the
distinguishability of different failure locations, at the- cost of
additional hardware.
3) Detection Window Length- For certain failures, correct detection and
identification can be assured at the expense of delayed decisions.
4) Detection sensitivity- Algorithm detection sensitivity can be optimized
subject to false alarm probability constraints through the choice
of decision rule thresholds and assumed plant and sensor noise
intensities,
Our methodology for illustrating these design variables is organized as follows.
In section 4.2 the GLR algorithm will be applied to a typical AGT vehicle,
using the vehicle model by Pitts. Experimental simulation results in detection
of bias failures will be presented in section 4.3. Problems in distinguishing
wind and grade forces from propulsion system failures when a detailed model is
used will be demonstrated, Then section 4.4 illustrates how simplified vehicle
models can decrease the algorithm's sensitivity to wind and grade. Section
4.5 provides an alternative to model choice by means of physically redundant
sensors to address the problem of identification delay. Finally, detection
of failure types other than biases will be addressed in section 4.6,
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4.2 Design of the Algorithm - Pitts' Vehicle Model
This section shows how the steps outlined in section 3.10 can be
followed to apply the GLR algorithm to the AGT vehicle.
System Model (Step 1)
4.2.1 Dynamics and Measurements
The transformed, linear, continuous-time vehicle model by Pitts [193
is chosen to represent the vehicle dynamics. The state equation is
repeated here:
x(t) 0 l 0 x(t) 0 0
=10 0 1 v(t) + 0 E c(t) + 0 (2-1)
(t) [0 -c - a(t) K (t)
The position and velocity sensor measurements are represented in the
measurement equation:
m +(2-2)v~Ct)
V (t) 1 0 1 0 n 2 (t)
mL - L- a (t)
For illustration purposes, the constants. C0 , C 1 , and KM were chosen to
represent the nominal personal rapid transit vehicle of Table 2.2. A 0.10
second sampling interval (10 HZ sampling rate) was chosen as representative
for AGT vehicles [26]. The discrete-time equivalent of the vehicle model
(2-1), (2-2) was computed (Appendix B) and is given below:
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x(k+l) = Dx (k) + BE (k) + W(k)
z (k) = Cx(k) + n(k)
with x(k) = [x(k)v(k)a(k)] , z(k) =
W(k) = [W1 (k)w (k)w 3(k)] , n(k)
[x (k)v (k)]T
m m
= [n (k)n 2(k)]T
and
1.0 8.
0 0.7
0 -3.2
1. 25E-3
BJ 2.92E-2
[3.35E-1J
9E-2
17
5
1.74E-3
1.99E-2
-6.25E-2
C =
10
0
1
0
0
4.2.2 Characterization of Plant and Sensor Noise
In section 3.1 we stated that the plant noise process Q_(k) and the
sensor noise process n(k) are modelled as independent, zero mean, uncorrelated
Gaussian sequences with covariances
T Rj=k
E[n(j)W (k)] =
EI~n(j)n T(k)] R j~k
0jk
The numerical values chosen for Q and R in essence determine the sensitivity
of the Kalman filter, and hence of the detection algorithm. This choice, in
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(4-1)
(4-2)
conjunction with the decision rule, will determine the algorithm's sensitivity
to both actual failures, and external disturbances which may cause false
alarms.
Finding appropriate numerical values for Q and R can often be a dif-
ficult task. If it is known that o(k) and n(k) are indeed Gaussian with
statistics which can be determined, these values should be used; the filter
will then be optimal. In reality, however, the processes which W(k) and
n(k) model are not necessarily, or even likely, Gaussian processes. This
nevertheless does not constrain systematic tradeoffs in algorithm performance
as measured by false alarms and missed detections. The matrices Q and R
can be used parametrically to facilitate the algorithm's performance tradeoffs.
In this study, in order to illustrate the GLR methodology, the charac-
terization of the plant and sensor noise was done in a relatively ad-hoc
procedure. Lacking accurate information, it was estimated that the standard
deviation (lr level) of the noise in the voltage applied to the motor, E(k),
compared to the voltage command, E (k) , might be on the order of 1.0 volt
c
(1% at 10 m/s line speed).
Noise in the voltage applied to the motor propagates into the position,
velocity, and acceleration states during each sampling interval. The noise
can be modelled in the discrete-time state equation (4-1) by the correlated
random variables w (k), (k) and w (k) which comprise the plant noise1 2 3
covariance matrix Q was computed (Appendix B) to be a statistically equiyalent
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representation of the noise in the motor voltage, and is given in
Table 4.1.
Position measurements were modelled to contain noise having a la
level of 0.1 meter. The la level of the velocity sensor noise was chosen
to be 0.1 m/s and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the position sensor
noise. These values were chosen to be consistent with the simulations
done in [26]. The resulting covariance matrix R of the sensor noise
vector n(k) appears in Table 4.1.
If the statistics of the plant and sensor noise processes were known
with more accuracy, the same methodology which will be presented would
be applied.
4.2.3 Kalman-Bucy Filter Gain (Step 2)
With the above choices of <D, C, Q, and R, the Kalman-Bucy filter
was computed, via a computer solution to the discrete algebraic matrix
Riccati equation (Appendix C). The resulting values of the predicted error
covariance matrix E , updated error covariance Z, Kalman gain matrix K,
p
-1
residual covariance matrix V and its inverse, V , are given in Table 4.2.
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TABLE 4.1
PLANT AND SENSOR NOISE COVARIANCE MATRICES; PITTS' VEHICLE MODEL
PLANT NOISE
8. 50E-7
Q = Et (k)W(k)] = 1.51E-5
1. 56E-5
3,31E-4
1. 99E-3 1.19E-1]
States: 1) Position 2) Velocity 3) Acceleration
SENSOR NOISE
T
R = Efn(k) n(k)] =
.01
0 .01
Measurements: 1) Position 2) Velocity
STANDARD DEVIATIONS
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PLANT NOISE SENSOR NOISE
Position Velocity Acceleration Position Velocity
9.2E-4m 0.018m/s 0.34m/s2 .m/
Table 4.2
Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices
Pitts' Vehicle Model
F I L T E R
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.3268136302121680-01
0.573314240622441D+00
0.948811848384158D+00
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
9.51128D-01 7.44609D-02
-1.271220-02 6.66327D-01
5.49864D-02 -3.258200+00
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.39982D-03
1.85410D-02
-6.26477D-02
KBF FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
4.887180-02 1.27122D-02
1.27122D-02 6.87491D-02
-5.498640-02 1.994930-02
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
5.157480-04 1.43547D-04 -5.753590-04
1.435470-04 7.402050-04 2.063660-04
-5.753590-04 2.063660-04 1.26981D-01
UPDATED ERROR
4.887180-04
1.27122D-04
-5.49864D-04
COVARIANCE MATRIX
1.271220-04 -5.49864D-04
6.874910-04 1.994930-04
1.99493D-04 1.269450-01
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX (V) -
1.05157D-02 1.43547D-04
1.435470-04 1.07402D-02
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX INVERSE (V-INVERSE) -
9.511280+01 -1.271220+00
-1.27122D+00 9.31251D+01
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K A L M A N
4.2.4 Detection Window (Step 3)
For purposes of fully illustrating the GLR methodology, a sliding
window containing the previous three seconds of data was chosen as the
detection window. The choice of a detection window with no delay was
done so that the behavior of the likelihood ratios would not be obscured.
The size window is represented by the parameter values N=0 and M=30,
since the sampling rate is 10HZ. The detection window is represented
in Figure 4.1.
4.2.5 Failure Direction VeQtoxs (Step 4)
Sensor Failures
The measurement equation (4-2) represents the position and velocity
sensor measurements. As was illustrated in Chapter 3, (3-12), (3-13)
the choice of failure direction vectors:
f Position sensor bias failure (4-3)
0l direction vector
and
0
f Velocity sensor bias failure (4-4)
1 direction vector
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The Detection System Looks
it . For the Onset of a Failure
In This Sliding Window of
Time
I I I I
k-30....................... k-2 k-1 k
k-N
3.0 Second Detection Window
Present Time
A t = 0.
N =0
M=N
M - N +
Observations
1 Sec.
(Delay)
30
1 = 31
in Window
Figure 4.1
Visualization of Detection Window
0
k-M
t
.1
can be used to represent position and velocity sensors failures. These
vectors lie in the two-dimensional output space of the measurement equation.
Propulsion System Failures
The failure direction vector for actuator failures can be found by
modelling the failure as a bias in the continuous-time state equation. The
equivalent discrete-time failure direction vector can then be found.
A failure in any component (e.g., PCU, DC motor, drive train) of the
vehicle's propulsion system which changes its overall effectiveness can be
modelled by the addition of a bias, S, to the voltage actuator, as shown in
Figure 4.2. The continuous-time state equation (2-1) with the inclusion of the
bias can then be written as:
x(t) = Ax(t) + B (E (t)+ ) + w(t) (4-5a)
Ax(t) + B u(t) + W(t) + B B (4.5b)
c c
where B is the continuous-time control matrix [0 0 KM ]T By comparison
of (4-5b) to equation (3-10) we see the failure vector is given by:
0
f =0 (4-6)
-D K
K M
Thus the direction in state-space of the bias failure is [0 0 KM] and the
magnitude is volts.
The equivalent discrete-time failure direction vector can be found in
the same manner as the discrete-time control matrix B is found from the
continuous-time control matrix B (Appendix B), and is thus given by:
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wFROM
CONTROL
SYSTEM
E c(t)
VOLTAGE
COMMAND
TO FAILURE
DETECTION
SYSTEM
PROPULSION
p FORCE
BIAS MODELLING A
FAILURE IN THE
PROPULSION SYSTEM
Figure 4.2 - Model of a Propulsion System Failure
'I1
25E-3 1Propulsion system
_ 2.92E-2 bias failure (4-7)
3.35E-1 direction vector
The above vector can be scaled to be of unit magnitude; however, this was not
done, so that the magnitude of a propulsion system bias would remain in units
of volts.
We have thus defined the set of failure direction vectors {f } for a
position sensor failure (i=l), velocity sensor failure (i=2), and propulsion
system failure (i=3).
4.2.6. Failure Signatures
Failure Signature Matrices (Step 5)
The set of sensor bias and actuator bias failure signature matrices are
given in Table 4.3. They were computed from the equations given in [39,
Appendix A].
Weighted Failure Signatures (Step 6)
The failure signatures s.(r) = s. (r) s. (r)] i=1,2,3, for a position
il 1,2
sensor, velocity sensor, and propulsion system bias failure are shown in
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Information Matrices (Step 7)
The sensor bias and actuator bias information matrices are given in
Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3a
Failure Signature Matrices
a.) Sensor Failures
G( 0) -
1.00000D+00
0.0
G( 1) -
9.50107D-01
-8.01500D-03
G( 2) -
9.02215D-01
-1.22066D-02
G( 3) -
8.564580-01
-1.42203D-02
G( 4) -
8.12862D-01
-1.50051D-02
G( 5) -
7.71393D-01
-1.51043D-02
G( 6) -
7.319870-01
-1.48283D-02
G( 7) -
6.945640-01
-1.43544D-02
G( 8)
6.59037D-01
-1.37830D-02
G( 9) -
6.25317D-01
-1.31712D-02
G(10) -
5.93317D-01
-1.25507D-02
G(11) -
5.62951D-01
-1.193900-02
G(12) -
5.34137D-01
-1.13456D-02
G(13) -
5.0679OD-01
-1.077490-02
G(14) -
4.80856D-01
-1.02292D-02
G(15) -
4.56243D-01
-9.70889D-03
0.0
1.00000D+00
-1.87876D-02
9.50329D-01
-3.96787D-02
9.21823D-01
-6.12611D-02
9.05677D-01
-8.274830-02
8.966140-01
-1.037140-01
8.91 6020-01
-1.239390-01
8.88903D-01
-1.43319D--Cl
8.875220-01
-1.61815D-01
8.868870-01
-1 .794280-0 1
8.86672D-01
-1.96174D-01
8.86691D-01
-2.120840-01
8.868360-01
-2.27192D-01
8.870460-01
-2.41533D-01
8.87288D-01
-2.55143D-01
8.87541D-01
-2.68059D-01
8.87795D-01
G(16) -
4.32889D-01
-9.21382D-03
G(17) -
4.107300-01
-8.74328D-03
G(18) -
3.897060-01
-8.296.350-03
G(19) -
3.697580-01
-7.87204D-03
G(20) -
3.508300-01
-7.46929D-03
G(21) -
3.328720-01
-7.087070-03
G(22) -
3.15833D-01
-6.72436D-03
G(23)
2.99666D-01
-6.38019D-03
G(24) -
2.843270-01
-6.053620-03
G(25) -
2. 69773D-01
-5.74376D-03
G(26) -
2.55963D-01
-5.44976D-03
G(27) -
2.42861D-01,
-5.170800-03
G(28) -
2.30430D-01
-4.90612D-03
G(29) -
2.18634D-01
-4.65498D-03
G(30) -
2.074430-01
-4.41670D-03
-2.80316D-01
8. 88 0440-01
-2.91945D-01
8.882850-01
-3.029800-01
8.885160-01
-3.13450D-01
8.887370-01
-3.23384D-01
8.88947D-01
-3.328100-01
8.89147D-01
-3.41754D-01
8.89337D-01
-3.502390-01
8.89517D-01
-3.582910-01
8.89688D-01
-3. 659300-01
8.89851D-01
-3.731780-01
8.90005D-01
-3.80055D-01
8.90152D-01
-3.865800-01
8.90291D-01
-3.92771D-01
8.90422D-01
-3.98646D-01
8.90547D-01
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G( 0) -
1.00000D+00
0.0
G( 1) -
1.95011D+00
-8.015000-03
G( 2) -
2.852320+00
-2.02216D-02
G( 3) -
3.708780+00
-3.44419D-02
G( 4).-
4.52t64D+00
-4.94470D-02
G( 5) -
5.29303D+00
-6.45513D-02
G( 6) -
6.02502D+00
-7.937960-02
G( 7) -
6.71959D+00
-9.37340D-02
G( 8) -
7.37862D+00
-1.075170-01
G( 9) -
8.00394D+00
-1.206880-01
G(10) -
8.597260+00
-1.332390-01
G(11) -
9.16021D+00
-1.451780-01
G(12) -
9.69434D+00
-1.56523D-01
G(13) -
1.02011D+01
-1.67298D-01
G(14) -
1.068200+01
-1.77528D-01
0.0
1.00000D+00
6.90786D-02
1.66705D+00
1.755330-01
2.051160+00
3.00036D-01
2.27013D+00
4.31 639D-01
2.394390+00
5.64229D-01
2.46441D+00
6.94462D-01
2.503400+00
8.20566D-01
2.52466D+00
9.41672D-01
2.535810+00
1.05741D+00
2.54122D+00
1.167710+00
2.54338D+00
1.27263D+00
2.54373D+00
1.37234D+00
2.54309D+00
1.46704D+00
2.54193D+00
1.55694D+00
2.54050D+00
Table 4. 3b
Failure Signature Matrices
b.) Actuator Failures
G(15) -
0.0 1.11382D+o1
0.0 
--i.87236D-01
G(16) -
1.73816D-03 1.15711D+01
1.99336D-02 -1.964500-01
G(17) -
4.65822D-03 1.19819D+01
3.19735D-02 
-2.05194D-01
G(18)
8.16637D-03 1.23716D+01
3.88584D-02 
-2.13490D-01
G(19) -
1.19181D-02 1.27413D+01
4.27693D-02 -2.21362D-01
G(20) -
1.57204D-02 1.30922D+01
4.49763D-02 -2.288310-01
G(21) -
1.94672D-02 1.34250D+01
4.62082D-02 -2.359180-01
G(22) -
2.31019D-02 1.374090+01
4.688290-02 
-2.42643D-01
G(23) -
2.659620-02 1.404050+01
4.72396D-02 
-2.490230-01
G(24) -
2.99380D-02 1.43249D+01
4.74157D-02 -2.55076D-01
G(25) -
3.31236D-02 1.45946D+01
4.74896D-02 -2.608200-01
G(26) -
3.61549D-02 1.48506D+01
4.75063D-02 -2.66270D-01
G(27) -
3.90359D-02 1.50934D+01
4.74915D-02 -2.714410-01
G(28) -
4.17722D-02 1.53239D+01
4.745990-02 
-2.763470-01
G(29) -
4.437020-02 1.55425D+01
4.74199D-02 -2.810020-01
G(30) -
1.57500D+01
-2.854190-01
1.64226D+00
2.53896D+00
1.72324D+00
2.537400+00
1.80008D+00
2.53586D+00
1.87300D+00
2.53436D+00
1.942.18D+00
2.532910+00
2.00783D+00
2.53153D+00
2.07011D+00
2.53022D+00
2.12921D+00
2.52896D+00
2.18528D+00
2.52777D+00
2.238490+00
2.52664D+00
2.288970+00
2.52557D+00
2.33686D+00
2.52455D+00
2.382310+00
2.52358D+00
2.42 543D+00
2.52266D+00
.2.466340+00
2.52179D+00
2.505160+00
2. 52 097D+00
4.68360D-02
4.737620-02
4.91762D-02
4.733140-02
5.13969D-02
4.728700-02
5.35041D-02
4.72438D-02
5.55035D-02
4.72022D-02
5.74007D-02
4.71623D-02
5.92008D-02
4.71243D-02
6.090870-02
4.70882D-02
6.252920-02
4.705370-02
6.406680-02
4.70211D-02
6.55257D-02
4.69900D-02
6.69099D-02
4.69606D-02
6.82232D-02
4.69326D-02
6.946940-02
4.69061D-02
7.06517D-02
4.688090-02
7.17735D-02
4.6 8571D-02~
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Failure Signatures;
Pitts' Vehicle Model
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Table 4.4a
I nformation Matrices
a.) Sensor Failures
C( 0) -
9.511280+01
-1 .27122D+00
C( 1) -
1.80997D+02
-4.82633D+00
C( 2) -
2.58460D+02
-1.033730D+01
C( 3)
3.28277D+02
-1.751390+01
C( 4) -
3.91174D+02
-2.60924D+01
C( 5) -
4.47821D+02
-3.58322D+01
C( 6) -
4.938310+02
-4.631800+01
C( 7)
5.44760D+02
-1.271220+00
9.312510+01
-4.82633D+00
1.773080+02
-1.03370D+01
2.56684D+02
-1.751390+01
3.335680+02
C(16) -
7.98320D+02
-1.732130+02
-1.73213D+02
1.344230+03
C(17) -
8.14381D+02 -1.858080+02
-1.85808D+02 1.426480+03
C(18) -
8.288410+02
-1.981690+02
C(19) -
-2.60924D+01 8.41858D+02
4.092730+02 -2.10265D+02
-3.58322D+01
4.84561D+02
-4.651800+01
5.598850+02
-5.79585D+01
-5.795850+01 6.35516D+02
C( 8) -
5.86111D+02
-6.99858D+01
C( 9) -
6.23339D+02
-8.245280+01
C(10) -
6.56855D+02
-9.523150+01
C(11) -
6.870230+02
-1.082110+02
C(12) -
7.14191D+02
-1.212960+02
C(13) -
7.38645D+02
-1.344040+02
C(14) -
7.60660D+02
-1.474640+02
C(15) -
7.80478D+02
-1.60418D+02
C(20) -
8.535770+02
-2.22073D+02
C(21) -
8.64126D+02
-2.33576D+02
C(22) -
8.73623D+02
-2.447590+02
C(23) -
8.82173D+02
-2.556120+02
C(24) -
8.89870D+02
-2.66127D+02
C(25) -
8.96799D+02
-2.76300D+02
C(26) -
9.03037D+02
-2.86129D+02
C(27) -
9.08632D+02
-2.95614D+02
-6.998580+01
7.11621D+02
-8.24528D+01
7.88301D+02
-9.52315D+01
8.65621D+02
-1.08211D+02
9.43618D+02
-1.21296D+02
1.02231D+03
-1.344040+02
1.101720+03
-1.474640+02
1.18185D+03
-1.604180+02
1.262690+03
C(28) -
9.13708D+02
-3.04757D+02
C(29) -
9.18259D+02
-3.13560D+02
C(30) -
9.223560+02
-3.22029D+02
-1.981690+02
1.50942D+03
-2.10265D+02
1.59302D+03
-2.220730+02
1.677290+03
-2.335760+02
1.762200+03
-2.447590+02
1.84774D+03
-2.55612D+02
1.933880+03
-2.66127D+02
2.020610+03
-2.76300D+02
2.10792D+03
-2.86129D+02
2.19577D+03
-2.956140+02
2.284160+03
-3.04757D+02
2.37306D+03
-3.13560Di02
2.462460+03
-3.220290+02
2.55233D+03
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Table 4.4b
Information Matrices
b.) Actuator Failures
C( 0) -
9.51128D+01
-1 .27122D+00
0.0
C( 1) -
4.568650+02
6.165270+00
2.58119D-01
C( 2) -
1.23086D+03
4.24905D+01
1;34583D+00
C( 3) -
2.53958D+03
1.303580+02
3.919060+00
C( 4) -
4.48498D+03
2.912300+02
8.60260D+00
C( 5) -
7.15094D+03
5.43932D+02
1.594510+01
C( 6) -
1.06054D+04
9.04289D+02
2.64074D+01
C( 7) -
1.49025D+04
1..38522D+03
4.03652D+01
C( 8) -
2.00839D+04
1.99704D+03
5.81181D+01
C( 9) -
2.61809D+04
2.747770+03
7.98984D+01
C(10) -
3.321550+04
3.643460+03
1.058910+02
C(11) -
4.120170+04
4.638470+03
1.36193D+02
C(12) -
5.014660+04
5.885700+03
1.709160+02
-1.27122D+00
9.31,251D+01
0.0
6.16527D-r00
3.52085D+02
3.10055D+00
4.249050+01
7.45902D+02
9.26643D+00
1.30358D+02
1.23265D+03
1.76760D+01
2.912300+02
1.78164D+03
2.764210+01
5.43932D+02
2.37396D+03
3.87263D+01
9.04289D+02
2.999030+03
5.06819D+01
1.38522D+03
3.651380+03
6.33844D+01
1.99704D+03
4.328470+03
7.677980+01
2.747770+03
5.029370+03
9.08513D+01
3.64346D+03
5.75392D+03
1.05601D+02
4.68847D+03
6.50230D+03
1.210370+02
5.88570D+03
7.27483D+03
1.37170D+02
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.58119D-01
3.10055D+00
3.72022D-02
1.34583D+00
9.26643D+00
1.34089D-01
3.91906D+00
1.76760D+01
2.80242D-01
8.60260D+00
2.76421D+01
4.62801D-01
1.594510+01
3.87263D+01
6.728890-01
2.64074D+01
5.06819D+01
9.05487D-01
4.03652D+01
6.33844D+01
1 .15818D+00
5.81181D+01
7.677980+01
1.43009D+00
7.98984D+01
9.08513D+01
1.721090+00
1.05881D+02
1.056010+02
2.03147D+00
1.36193D+02
1.21037D+02
2.36160D+00
1.709160+02
1.371700+02
2.71186D+00
C(13) -
6.00513D+04
7.236860+03
2.101000+02
C(14) -
7.09119D+04
8.74255D+03
2.53762D+02
C(15) -
8.27202D+04
1.04025D+04
3.018940+02
C(16) -
9.546430+04
1.221570+04
3.54466D+02
C(17) -
1.091290+05
1.41805D+04
4.114280+02
C(18) -
1.236980+05
1.629480+04
4.72719D+02
C(19) -
1.33150D+05
1.855570+04
5.382590+02
C(20) -
1 .55466D+05
2.096040+04
6.079630+02
C(21) -
1.72621D+05
2.350560+04
6.81735D+02
C(22) -
1.9%593D+05
2.61877D+04
7.59470D+02
C(23) -
2.093580+05
2.90029D+04
8.41063D+C2
C(24) -
2.23891D+05-
3.194750+04
9.26400DA02
C(25) -
2.491660+05
3.501750+04
1.01537D+03
7.236860+03
8.07177D+03
1.54010D+02
8.74255D+03
8.89331D+03
1.71562D+02
1.040250+04
9.739550+03
1.89829D+02,
1.22157D+04
1.06104D+04
2.08811D+02
1.41805D+04
1.15059D+04
2.28504D+02
1.629480+04
1.24256D+04
2.48901D+02
1.855570+04
1.33693D+04
2.69993D+02
2.09604D+04
1.433670+04.
2.91768D+02
2.35056D+04
1.53271D+04
3.14213D+02
2.618770+04
1.63402D+04
3.373150+02
2.900290+04
1.73754D+04
3.61056D+02
3.19475D+04
1.84321D+04
3.85421D+02
3.501750+04
1.95&980+04
4.10391D+02
2.101000+02
1.54010D+02
3.08254D+00
2.537620+02
1.715620+02
3.47385D+00
3.01894D+02
1.898290+02
3.88587D+00
3.54466D+02
2.08811D+02
4.31859D+00
4.1 14230+02
2.285040+02
4.77189D+00
4.727190+02
2.489010+02
5.245600+00
5.33250D+02
2.69993D+02
5.73943D+00
6.07963D+02
2.91768D+02
6.25307D+00
6.817350+02
3.14213D+02
6.78612D+00
7.59470D+02
3.37315D+02
7.33817D+00
8.41063D+02
3.610560+02
7.908760+00
9.264000+02
3.85421D+02
8.49739D+00
1.015370+03
4.103910+02
9.10357D+00
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Information Measures (Step 8)
The information measures a. (r) i=1,2,3 for a position sensor, velocity
sensor, and propulsion system bias failure are shown in Figure 4.6.
4.3 Testing of the GLR Algorithm on a Simulated Vehicle-Detection
of Bias Failures
To test the performance of the GLR algorithm, a computer program was
developed to simulate the dynamics of an AGT vehicle. With this program,
the effects of maneuvers, grade transitions, and wind forces can be simulated.
Simulated sensor outputs, with or without additive Gaussian noise, can be
produced and stored for processing by a GLR detection algorithm under test,
implemented in another computer program. The vehicle simulator allows for
the emulation of a variety of vehicle failures, both in the sensors and in
the propulsion system. The details of the vehicle simulator and GLR programs
are provided in Appendix C. A block diagram representation of the
system which was simulated appears in Figure 4.7. In this simulated vehicle,
the motor voltage command and the velocity sensor and position sensor outputs
are digitized and sent to the failure detection computer which performs the
Kalman-Bucy filter and GLR algorithm calculations. The algorithm produces
three maximum likelihood ratios, Y. for the three possible failure locations:
position sensor (i=l), velocity sensor (i=2), and propulsion system (i=3).
In practice, these likelihood ratios would be used in a decision rule
to decide whether a failure has occurred; here, we will merely examine the
qualitative behavior of the maximum likelihood ratios, without choosing a
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specific decision rule. However, we will say that a failure can be
detected if one of the MLR's becomes "large" (i.e., relative to their nominal
values). If the largest of the three likelihood ratio 9*, i=1,2,3 corresponds
to the true location of the failure, then we will say that the location of
failure has been correctly identified.
The following sections will present the performance results of the GLR
algorithm in detecting bias failures in the simulated vehicle's sensors and
propulsion system. Detection of failure types other than biases will be
discussed in section 4.6.
Vehicle simulations were done both with and without additive Gaussian
noise in the sensors and vehicle plant. The simulations performed without
the noise were done to determine the mean trajectories of the likelihood
ratios, so that the expected performance could be seen without being obscured
by random effects. Noise will cause the likelihood ratios to have mean tra-
jectories which follow those to be shown in the figures plus a constant
value of 1. Likelihood ratios following a failure will have random fluctua-
2
tions with standard deviation 2+4S a (k;O) as a result of the noise.
4.3.1 Position Sensor Bias Failure
Scenario
The AGT vehicle was initialized to a constant velocity of 15 m/s at
position zero. At time 0=1.0 sec. a bias of magnitude 1.0 meter was added
to the vehicle's position sensor measurement, as shown in Figure 4.8. No
background noise was present in the plant or sensors.
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Figure 4.8
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Results
The simulated measurements and motor voltage command were processed
by the Kalman-Bucy filter and GLR algorithm. The likelihood ratios
Z.(r) i=1,2,3 for the hypothesized position sensor, velocity sensor, and
propulsion system failures, respectively, were computed. For each set, the
maximum over the detection window, Z* i=1,2,3, was chosen. This process
was repeated at each step in the simulation, producing the filter residuals,
Figure 4.9, and the trajectories of the three maximum likelihood ratios 2*,
Figure 4.10.
The maximum likelihood ratio (MLR) for the position sensor failure,
*, jumps to a value of 95.1 at the failure time a. At each succeeding time
step, 2 increases, tending toward an asymptotic value of about 900. The
asymptotic behavior is expected from the shape of a (r), Figure 4.6. The MLR
suddenly begins decreasing, however, three seconds following the failure.
This is because the onset of the bias begins to pass out of the three second
detection window and thus less of the signature is observed. It continues to
decay as time progresses, as less and less of the signature is present in the
residuals.
The maximum likelihood ratios for the other failure types, * and *',2 3
also increase after the failure, reaching a peak value approximately two
seconds after the failure, but then decay. At every step following the
failure, however, they remain well below 9*, the maximum likelihood ratio
for the actual failure type; this implies the failure is both detected and
identified correctly.
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The likelihood ratios in Figure 4.10 correspond to a position sensor bias
with a magnitude of 1.0 meter. The values of the likelihood ratios for a
bias of arbitrary magnitude S can be determined by scaling the curves in
2
Figure 4.10 by the constant .
The standard deviation of the fluctuations expected in the behavior of
91 following the failure as a result of the background plant and sensor noise
is shown in Figure 4.10. Nevertheless, the position sensor bias failure was
repeated, with Gaussian plant and sensor noise included in the simulation.
The variances of these disturbances were equal to the statistics assumed in
the system model and Kalman-Bucy filter, Table 4.1. The filter residuals
are plotted in Figure 4.11. Note the correspondence between the observed
residuals here and the position sensor bias signature, Figure 4.3. The
maximum likelihood ratio trajectories for the noisy run are shown in Figure
4.12. The magnitude of k* is only slightly less than it is in the case without1
the noise, Figure 4.10.
It is common practice to relate the magnitude of a sensor failure bias
to the standard deviation, 0, of the additive Gaussian noise for that sensor.
The 1.0 meter bias magnitude used for the above simulated failure represents
a 10a failure. To examine the detection sensitivity, a la failure was also
simulated with a bias to the position sensor of 10cm. The signature in the
residuals is barely discernable by a visual examination (Figure 4.13). The
maximum likelihood ratios are shown in Figure 4.14. The MLR for the position
sensor failure, 2i, remains greater than the others from 0.5 second after the
failure until the true failure time passes out of the detection window. Thus,
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if a failure of this size is to be detected, it would have to be done during
this interval, as the failure signature rapidly disappears.
Summary of Results
The preceeding results can be sumxarized as follows:
1) The position sensor bias caused to approach an asymptotic
2
value proportional to .
2) * decayed rapidly once the failure time 0 left the detection
window.
3) The algorithm could unambiguously identify the true location
of the failure.
4) Background noise did not affect detection of a 1OU failure.
A la failure is barely detectable.
5) Lengthening the detection window will not improve detection
of small failures.
4.3.2 Velocity Sensor Bias Failure
Scenario
A velocity sensor failure was simulated with the addition of a 1.0m/s
bias to the velocity measurement. Since the velocity sensor is part of
the control feedback loop, the bias caused the vehicle behavior shown in
Figure 4.15. The velocity regulator, believing the vehicle to suddenly be
travelling 1.0m/s faster than the commanded velocity, ordered the vehicle
to decrease its speed, as shown in the figure. Before the failure, the
vehicle was travelling at a velocity of 15m/s. No background noise was
present.
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Vehicle Behavior, Velocity Sensor Bias
Results
The maximum likelihood ratiosi* following the sensor bias are shown
1
in Figure 4.16. At time 0, the MLR's 9*2 and * both jump to a value of 93.2 3
With the one observation at time 0, the algorithm can detect the failure,
but cannot uniquely identify the failure's location since and 2 are the2 3
same. This behavior is expected, since by looking at only the first point,
the velocity sensor and propulsion system failure signatures (Figure 4.4
and 4.5) are indistinguishable. As more observations are made, the algorithm
identifies the true failure location, and * grows larger than Z*.
2 3
The standard deviation of the expected random fluctuations of 2* following2
the failure is shown in Figure 4.16. The time until V* leaves this "band"3
around 9* provides an estimate of the time required for unambiguous identifi-
2
cation of the failure location.
The velocity sensor MLR, 2, continues to increase, even after the2
failure time has left the detection window, in contrast to the behavior
of 9/ following the position sensor failure (section 4.3.1). The value of
.* continues to grow in this case as the residuals contain a non-zero mean2
as long as the bias persists, as shown in Figure 4.17.
The velocity sensor bias failure simulation was repeated with the
addition of Gaussian plant and sensor noise. Noisy residuals for the 1.0m/s
bias are shown in Figure 4.18, and the resulting MLR's in Figure 4.19.
Addition of the noise produced only a slight degradation of performance.
As the 1.0m/s bias represents a 10a bias magnitude, a la failure was also
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simulated, via a bias magnitude of 0.lm/s. The resulting residuals and
MLR's are shown in Figures 4.20 and 4.21. Since Z* continues to grow,
independent of the length of the detection window, the failure would
eventually be detected.
Summary of Results
1) The velocity sensor bias caused * to grow linearly with time.2
2) 22 continued to grow, although at a slower rate, even when2
the failure time 0 left the detection window.
3) There was a delay until the true location of the failure could
be unambiguously identified to be a velocity sensor and not a
propulsion system failure.
4) Background noise did not affect detection of either a 10a
or la failure.
5) Small failures will be detected independent of the length of
the detection window, although they can be detected sooner
with a longer window.
4.3.3 Propulsion System Bias Failure
Scenario
A bias failure in the propulsion system was simulated by the addition
of a 10 volt bias to the PCU (voltage actuator) , as shown in Figure 4.2.
The bias caused the vehicle to rapidly accelerate from its initial velocity
of 15m/s to a velocity of 15.8m/s. The control system, sensing the overspeed
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condition via the velocity sensor feedback, began to slowly decrease the
motor voltage command (Figure 4.22). The vehicle's behavior is shown in
Figure 4.23.
Results
The signature of the propulsion system failure is clearly seen in the
filter residuals, Figure 4.24. Increasing in an exponential fashion, Z*3
does not exhibit a large "jump" at the time of the failure. Not able to
initially determine the location of the failure, Z* and Z* both remain2 3
close for approximately one-half second following the failure. As more
observations are made, the location of the failure is identified, and Z33
grows larger than *, Figure 4.25. Since the residual remain non-zero, Z*2 3
continues to increase after the failure time 0 has left the detection window.
With the addition of plant and sensor Gaussian noise in the simulation,
a 100 (10 volt) and la (1 volt) bias failure was performed. Detection of
the 10a failure was not significantly affected by the noise (Figure 4.26
and 4.27). Although the effect of the noise is apparent on the residuals
(Figure 4.28) and MLR's (Figure 4.29) detection of the 1cr failure is still
possible.
Summary of Results
1) The propulsion system bias caused A* to grow in an exponential3
fashion, increasing slowly during the first one half second.
2) Although continuing to grow once 0 left the detection window,
the rate of increase was reduced.
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3) There was a delay until the true location of the failure
could be unambiguously identified to be in the propulsion
system and not the velocity sensor.
4) Background noise did not affect the detection of a 10a
failure.
5) Detection of a la failure is still possible.
Failure-Free Performance: Noise, Maneuvers, Grade and Wind
In the previous sections we have demonstrated the GLR algorithm's
ability to detect sensor and propulsion system bias failures. A key
performance characteristic which remains to be examined is the response
of the algorithm to failure-free noise, maneuvers, and unmodelled forces
such as wind and grade acting on the vehicle. The sensitivity of the
algorithm to these effects will determine the false-alarm characteristics
of the algorithm. The following sections present tests of the GLR algorithm
on simulated vehicle data which includes these disturbances and forces, but
is free of any vehicle failures.
4.3.4 Gaussian Plant and Sensor Noise
The effects of Gaussian plant and sensor noise on the likelihood ratios
in the presence of a failure have been examined. The variance, due to the
noise, of P* = 2. (k; 0=0) can be computed analytically (equation 3-33b).
Under failure-free conditions, each likelihood ratio Z . (k;e) in the
detection window k-M < 0 < k-N is a central chi-squared random variable,
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with mean 1 and a variance of 2. However, the density function for
(k), the maximum of the likelihood ratios over the detection window,
can not readily be determined (the LR's are mutually correlated). Since k*i
is used in the decision rule, clearly its nominal behavior and range of
values must be determined. We shall do this via simulations.
Scenario
In this ten second simulation, the vehicle was commanded to maintain a
constant velocity of 15m/s. Gaussian plant and sensor noise was added to
the propulsion system and measurements. The intensity of the noise "matched"
the intensity assumed in the design of the Kalman-Bucy filter.
Results
The response of the vehicle to the random disturbances is illustrated
in Figure 4.30. Residual and maximum likelihood ratios appear in Figure 4.31
and 4.32. It is observed that the MLR's lie in a range 0-7. We could use
this observation in determining thresholds in a decision rule, since the
observed range of the MLR's implies that a lower bound on a failure decision
threshold must be at least 7 to avoid false alarms caused solely by the
background noise. However, as shall be seen, the effect of wind and grade
forces will in practice play the largest role in the determination of
decision thresholds.
4.3.5 Commanded Vehicle Maneuvers
It is clearly essential that the failure detection system not respond
to normal maneuvers of the vehicle. During maneuvers, however, the effects
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of sampling may be the greatest, thus adversely affecting the failure
detection system.
The discretized vehicle model embedded in the Kalman-Bucy filter
assumes that the input to the model, Ec (k) is the same as the input to the
motor, and is held constant over the time period k to k+l with a zero-order
hold (Figure 4.7); in fact the motor voltage command E c(t) is not constant
over the interval when maneuvers are being performed. This will cause a
slight discrepancy between the actual vehicle and the discretized model in
the failure detection system. The discrepancy will be the greatest when the
vehicle is at maximum acceleration, for then the rate of change of the motor
voltage command will be at its maximum, and the error (shaded area,
Figure 4.33) will be greatest. The amount of error in the approximation to
the voltage command will depend on the sampling rate.
Scenario
The vehicle was commanded to increase its velocity from 15m/s to 18m/s
at service limits, via the jerk profile, Figure 2.2. Vehicle response is
shown in Figure 4.34. No Gaussian noise was present.
Results
As predicted, the peak of the velocity residual (Figure 4.35) coincides
with the vehicle's period of maximum acceleration. The propulsion system
MLR 9i reaches a peak value of 12 during the maneuvers (Figure 4.36).3
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Summary
The effects of errors induced by discrete-time sampling must be taken
into consideration, as these errors may become large during vehicle maneuvers.
If sampling rates are high enough, however, vehicle maneuvers will not cause
false alarms.
4.3.6 Wind and Grade
The two forces acting on the vehicle which are most likely to cause false
alarms are wind and grade forces. These unmodelled forces will appear to
the GLR algorithm as bias failures in the propulsion system. To gain an ap-
preciation for the magnitude of these forces, the propulsive force required to
maintain a constant velocity in the presence of a 6% grade or a 30m/s headwind
may be on the order of 5 times the propulsive force necessary to maintain that
velocity on a level guideway with no wind. Simulations were performed to
determine the GLR algorithm's sensitivity to these forces.
Scenario (Grade)
To determine the effects of grade, the transition from a level guideway
to a 6% grade was simulated. The grade transition, beginning at time t=1.0,
occurred at a constant rate of 10%/sec so that the 6% transition was completed
in 0.6 sec. (Figure 4.37). This represents a transition length of 9 meters.
The grade remained in effect for the remainder of the simulation. The response
of the vehicle to the grade force is shown in Figure 4.38.
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Results
The Kalman-Bucy filter residuals are shown in Figure 4.39. Observe
that they contain a signature similar to a propulsion bias failure. The
*
maximum likelihood ratio for the voltage actuator failure, k3, shows in
Figure 4.40, that this is indeed the case. Nine seconds after the transition
was begun, this MLR reaches a value near 125.
Scenario (Wind)
A simulation was performed in which the vehicle, at a velocity of 15m/s,
encountered an 18m/s headwind gust. Relative to the vehicle, the wind trans-
ition from 0-18m/s lasted one-half second, occurring at a constant rate
(Figure 4.41). Vehicle response to the headwind is shown in Figure 4.42.
Results
Filter residuals (Figure 4.43) and likelihood ratios (Figure 4.44) are
similar to those caused by the grade, although of a larger magnitude. Nine
seconds after the initiation of the gust, A* has reached a value near 1000.
3
Summary of Results
1) Wind and grade appear to the detection system as propulsion
failures, since although the motor voltage command is
increasing, observed velocity decreases.
2) The likelihood ratio t* continues to grow as long as3
the wind or grade force is present, even when the
transition time has passed out of the detection window.
3) Wind and grades are thus likely to cause false alarms.
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Discussion
Wind and grade forces may pose formidable problems for the failure
detection system, as the distinguishability between the effects of these
forces and failures in the propulsion system is difficult.
Decreasing the sensitivity of the algorithm, either by raising decision
thresholds or by increasing the assumed variance of the plant noise is not
a viable solution since 1) the likelihood ratios keep growing, and 2) this
will worsen propulsion failure detection performance.
One possible solution to the false alarm problem is to model wind and
grade explicitly in the vehicle model. This would require on-line measurements
of these forces. Although guideway grade information could be stored on-board
the vehicle (e.g., in a processor's read-only-memory), an on-board air speed
indicator is required for wind measurement; the cost of the additional hardware
would be prohibitive.
Another alternative is to replace Pitts' relatively detailed vehicle
model with a simplified model which will not contain modelling errors in the
presence of wind and grade. This possible solution will now be examined.
4.4 Simplified Vehicle Models
4.4.1 Introduction
The system model, (3-1) and (3-2) plays a key role in the GLR algorithms
ability to detect various failures, to identify the location of the failure
in the system, and to avoid false alarms caused by various disturbances. The
purpose of this section is to illustrate how the choice of different system
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models can provide tradeoffs of the algorithms performance under both
failure and failure-free conditions.
In Pitts' vehicle model (2-1), used in developing the GLR algorithm,
assumptions about the vehicle's motor characteristics, load, and forces
acting on the vehicle were made in the choice of the parameters CO' C1 , and
K . These uncertain parameters cause the modelling errors which cause falseM
alarms. The vehicle models we will now examine contain no parameter uncertainty;
they employ kinematic relationships which are known with certainty.
4.4.2 Model Descriptions
The first alternative vehicle model we will present makes only one as-
sumption about the AGT vehicle's dynamics - namely, that the vehicle's
velocity will follow, reasonably well, the velocity command generated by the
velocity command generator. The extent to which this assumption is valid,
even in the presence of winds and grades, will depend on the ability of the
velocity regulator to maintain commanded velocity. The assumption can be
modelled as follows:
x(t) = [0]x(t) + v (t) + W(t) (4-8)
c
where x(t) is the vehicle's position, v c(t) is the velocity command, and
w(t) represents the difference between the commanded and actual velocities.
A measurement of position is represented by:
x (t) = [1]x(t) + n1 (t) (4-9)
-118-
where x (t) is the position sensor measurement and n (t) is the measurement
noise.
The above model's single state variable, position, prevents the repre-
sentation of a velocity sensor measurement. Through the addition of a
velocity state variable, and by modelling the kinematic relationship between
position and velocity (i.e., that the derivative w.r.t. time of position is
velocity) we are able to employ the available velocity measurement in the
model:
x(t) 0 1 x(t) 0 0
+ a (t) + (4-10)
(t) 0 0 Vt] c (t)
x (t) 1 0 x(t) n (t
+ (4-11)
v (t) 0 1 v(t) n (t)
where x(t) is the vehicle's position, v(t) its velocity, a (t) the commandedC
acceleration (the derivative of v (t)),w (t) the difference between actual
C
and commanded acceleration, xm(t) and v m(t) the sensor measurements of position
and velocity, and n (t) and n 2t) the measurement noise. Due to the
structure of the velocity command generator of our study vehicle (Figure 2.3),
the acceleration command a (t) could be made readily available.
Intuitively, position and velocity sensor failures will be detected by
the GLR algorithm employing the above models by the apparent violation of the
kinematic relationship between position and velocity which is observed during
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a sensor failure. Propulsion system failures will be detected when the
commanded velocity (acceleration) differs greatly from the actual velocity
(acceleration).
Since the above models represent Kinematic relationships and use
velocity or acceleration Commands as input, we shall refer to (4-8), (4-9)
and (4-10), (4-11) as vehicle models KCl and KC2 respectively.
The discrete-time equivalents to the above continuous-time models can
be found (Appendix B) and are given below for a sampling interval of
At=0.l second:
KCl - Kinematic Vehicle Model; Velocity Command Input
State Equation
x(k+l) = [lx(k) + [O.1]v (k) + o(k) (4-12)
c
Measurement Equation
x (k) = [l]x(k) + n (k) (4-13)
KC2 - Kinematic Vehicle Model; Acceleration Command Input
State Equation
x(k+l) 1.0 .l - x(k) 5.0E-3 a (k)
v~kl) o] iZI+ [~~a (k) {+ ] (4-14)lv(k+1)l 0 1.0 [v k) 0.1 c 2(k)
Measurement Equation
x (k) 1 0 x k) n 1(k)
+ (4-15)
v (k) 0 l v k n (k)
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The above models can be simplified even further by a model which makes
no assumptions about the vehicles control or propulsion system. The following
model simply represents the kinematic relationship between position and
velocity measurements:
State Equation
x(t) = [0]x(t) + v (t) + n (t) (4-16)
M 2
Measurement Equation
x (t) = [l)x(t) + n (t)
m1
where x(t) is the vehicle's position, x (t) and v (t) the measured position
m m
and velocity, and n1 (t) and n2 (t) the measurement noise. This representation
is comparable to (4-8), except the velocity sensor measurement is used to
drive the state variable, instead of the velocity command. Notice the
manipulated model above contains no plant noise; only measurement noise is
present.
Intuitively, the GLR algorithm, when based on this vehicle model, will
detect sensor failures by the invalidation of the kinematic relation which
should relate the position and velocity measurements. Since the propulsion
system is not modelled, propulsion system failures can not be detected;
however, wind and grade will not cause false alarms, since these forces will
not affect the sensors' kinematic relationship. Thus we see the tradeoff
between detection ability and false alarms taken to one extreme.
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Since the above model employs Kinematic relationships and uses a Sensor
measurement as input, it will be referred to as KS1. The equivalent discrete-
time representation is given below:
KSl - Kinematic Vehicle Model; Velocity Sensor Input
State Equation
x(k+l) = [l]x(k) + [O.l1]v (k) + n (k)
m 2 (4-18)
Measurement Equation
x (k) [l]x(k) + n (k) (4-19)
m1
The three models KSl, KCl and KC2, whose block diagrams are shown
in Figure 4.45, were used in the GLR algorithm and tested under conditions
identical to those used in testing the algorithm based on Pitts' model. The
failure signatures are shown in Figures 4.46 - 4.48 for position sensor,
velocity sensor, and propulsion system bias failures. Tha plant and sensor
noise statistics chosen and the resulting Kalman-Bucy filter matrices are
given in Tables 4.5 - 4.7.
4.4.3 Performance Results with Simplified Models
4.4.3.1 Position Sensor Bias Failure
The GLR algorithm using the three simplified vehicle models KS1, KCl,
and KC2 was run on the position sensor bias failure data (section 4.3.1)
Maximum likelihood ratios, (including those previously shown when Pitts' model
was used) appear in Figure 4.49.
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Table 4.5
Noise Covariance and Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices
Sensor Driven Kinematic Vehicle Model KS1
DISCRETE DRIVING NOISE COVARIANCE MATRIX (0) -
1.OOOOOD-04
MEASUREMENT NOISE COVARIANCE MATRIX (R) -
1.00000D-02
K A L M A N F I L T E R
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.904875078027496D+00
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
9.04875D-01
KBF FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
9.51249D-02
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
1.05125D-03
UPDATED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
9.51249D-04
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX
1.10512D-02
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX
9.04875D+01
(V) -
INVERSE (V-INVERSE) -
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Table 4.6
Noise Covariance and Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices
Velocity Command Driven Kinematic Model KC1
DISCRETE DRIVING NOISE COVARIANCE MATRIX (Q) -
6.40000D-03
MEASUREMENT NOISE COVARIANCE MATRIX (R) -
1.OOOOOD-02
K A L M A N F I L T E R -
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.458373630858480D+00
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
4.58374D-01
KBF FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
3.41626D-01
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
1.18163D-02
UPDATED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
5.41626D-03
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX (V) -
2.18163D-02
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX INVERSE (V-INVERSE) -
4.58374D+01
Table 4.7
Noise Covariance and Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices
Acceleration Command Driven Kinematic Model KC2
DISCRETE DRIVING NOISE COVARIANCE MATRIX (Q) -
1.25000D-05 2.50000D-04
2.50000D-04 5.000000-03
MEASUREMENT NOISE COVARIANCE MATRIX (R) -
1.0000OD-02 0.0
3.0 1.OOOOOD-02
F I L T E R-
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.503867959357659D+00
0.90381949472481 1D+00
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
9.08219D-01 2.85807D-02
-6.22412D-02 4.99469D-01
K8F FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
9.17811D-02 6.22412D-02
6.22412D-02 4.94307D-01
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE
1.10422D-03 1.36672D-03
1.36672D-03 9.943070-03
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
0.0
MATRIX
UPDATED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
9.17811D-04 6.22412D-04
'.22412D-04 4.94307D-03
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX (V) -
1.11042D-02 1.366720-03
1.36672D-03 1.99431D-02
RESIDUAL COV MATRIX INVERSE (V-INVERSE) -
9.08219D+01 -6.22412D+00
-6.22412D+00 5.05693D+01
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The position sensor failure was detected and eventually identified
correctly with all of the models. The ability of the algorithm to initially
identify the location of the failure varies, however, with the use of the
different models. Only after a number of observations have been taken can
KSl and KCl properly identify the failure location, as the two MLR's in each
case jump initially to the same value. Intuitively, the situation is com-
parable to a dual-redundant set of sensors - when one fails, it can be
deduced that there has been a failure, but not which one has failed. In the
case of KS1 and KCl, the algorithm has two pieces of "analytically redundant"
information - the measurement and the input to the state equation; initially,
there is no way to determine which one corresponds to the failure. The
physically redundant sensors require a third sensor to properly identify the
location of the failure; the GLR algorithm uses the structure of the models
KS1 and KCl to act as the third piece of information required for proper
identification.
The detection algorithms based on Pitts' model and KC2, are able to
initially identify the true failure location. This result is useful, as it
implies that with these models no delay is required to detect and identify
a position sensor failure.
Summary of Results
1) Detection of the failure is comparable using all four
vehicle models.
2) The single-state variable models KS1 and KCl require a
delay before the location of the failure can be identified.
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3) The algorithm using Pitts' model provides the minimum
identification delay.
4.4.3.2 Velocity Sensor Bias Failure
The MLR's from the simulated velocity sensor bias (section 4.3.2) are
shown in Figure 4.50. The model KCl is not included as it does not model
a velocity measurement. The velocity sensor failure was detected and
eventually identified correctly by the algorithm with the three models KS1,
KC2, and Pitts'. Even after the true failure time has passed out of the
detection window, the MLR's continue to increase, so that biases of small
magnitudes will eventually be detected.
Initially, the algorithm based on KC2 and Pitts' models cannot distinguish
between the velocity sensor failure and a propulsion failure. A strategy
to improve this failure location identification delay will be discussed in
section 4.5.
Summary of Results
1) Detection ability is comparable using the models KS1, KC2,
and Pitts'.
2) A delay before the location of the failure can be identified
is required with the three models.
4.4.3.3 Propulsion System Bias Failure
The GLR algorithms based on the models KS1, KCl, KC2 and Pitts were
run on the simulated 10 volt PCU bias failure data (section 4.3.3). Maximum
-132-
Position Sensor
. 4..
I I I I I I I I I
8 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +90
-400.
/ .e*2 
-- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -
- : Position Sensor
0. .. j ......." .2 : velocity Sensor
- -
3 Propulsion Sys.
3-
....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
KC2
+ + +4.0 I I I I
a +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9-0
2-
Position Sensor
Velocity Sensor
Pitts
3
5.'e3
* --------
6 +1.0 +2.0 +30
FAILURE TIME G IN
DETECTION WINDOW
+4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0
1(sec)
~~~1
+9.0
Figure 4. 50
Maximum Likelihood Ratios, Velocity Sensor Bias
-133-
3000 .~
8
.5'
- --.. -.. ~- KS1
3000 .
0.
3000.
0.
F
-- 2 ensor
likelihood ratios are shown in Figure 4.51.
The algorithm based on the model KS1 could not detect the failure, as
the propulsion system is not modelled in the algorithm.
With KCl used in the algorithm, the propulsion system likelihood ratio
grows due to the continued discrepancy between the commanded and actual
vehicle velocities. With KC2, the transient acceleration, causing a
temporary discrepancy between commanded and actual acceleration, produces
a peak in the likelihood ratio.
Summary of Results
1) The kinematic sensor model KSl could not detect the failure.
2) The velocity command driven model KCl performed better
than the acceleration command driven model KC2.
3) Initial identification of failure location was not pos-
sible with any of the models used in the algorithm.
4.4.3.4 Wind, Grade, Maneuvers, and Noise
The MLR's obtained from the wind and grade disturbance runs appear
in Figures 4.52 and 4.53. The improvement in false alarm performance af-
forded by the models KSl, KC1, and KC2 compared to Pitts' is clearly evident.
The MLR's obtained when the model KS1 was used remain extremely small,
as expected, since the wind or grade forces do not affect the sensors'
kinematic relationship. The slight increase which is observed is due
solely to the effects of sampling.
The wind and grade forces appear to the algorithm using the model
KCl as a small propulsion system failure, due to the difference between
-134-
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the vehicle's commanded velocicty and its actual velocity which has
decreased slightly as a result of the force. With the vehicle model and
the control system we have simulated, in the presence of the wind the MLR
reaches a peak of only 4.0 and then decreases. In general, the peak value
of the MLR will depend on the control system's ability to keep the vehicle's
velocity at the commanded velocity; if the control system has a high enough
bandwidth we would not expect a false alarm with this model used in the
algorithm.
The algorithm with the model KC2 detects the temporary acceleration as
a result of the application of the wind and grade forces. The MLR reaches
a maximum value of 3.0 and then decays rapidly.
The peak values of the MLR's for both models KCl and KC2 are seen to
be insignificant when compared to the MLR's obtained during the line speed
change maneuver (Figure 4.54) and random Gaussian noise (Figure 4.55).
Since the thresholds in the decision rule would have to be set to tolerate
these values, it is unlikely that false alarms would be generated solely
by the wind or grade forces.
Regardless of the numerical values of the MLR peaks as a result of
the wind or grade, the behavior of the MLR's contrasts significantly with
their behavior when Pitts' vehicle model was used in the algorithm. The
fact that they do not continue to increase, as they do with Pitts, il-
lustrates how the choice of the vehicle model can have a significant effect
on false alarm performance.
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To illustrate the improvement in performance afforded by the simplified
models, we have simulated a worst case situation in which a fully loaded
vehicle is commanded to increase its velocity just as a 6% grade and 18m/s
headwind are encountered. The behavior of the vehicle is shown in Figure
4.56. The MLR's from the algorithm using the models KCl and KC2 (Figure
4.57) reach peaks values sightly higher than those from the 10 volt pro-
pulsion system bias failure. By setting thresholds at these levels, pro-
pulsion system bias failures greater than 10 volts could still be detected
and false alarms could be avoided.
Since the detection of sensor failures is not compromised with the
use of the simplified vehicle models, the added complexity of Pitts'
vehicle model may not to be required to maintain acceptable detection
performance.
Summary of Results
1) The simplified vehicle models provide improved false alarm
performance for wind and grade disturbances. The likelihood
ratios produced by these forces are less than those
produced from maneuvers and background noise.
2) Decision rule thresholds could be set so that the algorithm
using a simplified model would not cause a false alarm
during a worst case combination of wind, grade and load,
and still retain the ability to detect propulsion system
failures.
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4. 4. 4 Summary
The models discussed in this section were chosen to illustrate how
varying degrees of model complexity can be used in the GLR algorithm. On
one end of the spectrum lies the simple kinematic model KS1, valid for any
vehicle; on the other, Pitts' model represents the dynamics of a particular
DC motor driven vehicle.
The models we have examined can be divided into three model classes,
and generalizations made about the algorithm's performance using each model
class:
1) Kinematic, Sensor Driven Models (KSl)
a) Can detect sensor failures
b) Cannot detect propulsion system failures
c) Will not false alarm from external disturbances
2) Kinematic, Control Command Driven Model (KCl and KC2)
a) Can detect sensor failures
b) Can detect propulsion failures
c) Distinguishability between sensor and propulsion
system failures can be achieved with a delay
d) Disturbances will not cause false alarms, although
the extent to which this is true will depend on the
vehicle control system
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3) Parameterized Models (Pitts)
a) Can detect sensor failures
b) Parameter uncertainty must be dealt with
c) Failure detection may be superior than with the
simplified models when the parameters are
"matched" to true vehicle conditions.
d) When parameters are not matched, false alarms
will occur.
It appears that very simple vehicle models are the least sensitive
to external disturbances, but can still maintain failure detection
capability. In the long run, they may thus prove to be the best suited
for use in AGT vehicle systems.
4.5 Physically Redundant Sensors
4.5.1 Introduction
Failure detection and identification, in general, can nearly always
be improved with the use of redundant sets of like sensors. Such re-
dundancy is called "physical" redundancy. The performance of the GLR
algorithm, based on the concept of "analytic" redundancy, can also be im-
proved with the addition of physically redundant sensor measurements.
The modification to the algorithm is (trivially) straightforward - the
improvement in failure detection and identification can be significant.
The GLR algorithm is well suited to the management of redundant
sensors; additional voting algorithms or voting hardware is not required.
In the absence of failures, the algorithm produces the minimum-mean-squared-
error estimate of the true state being measured (i.e., optimally filtered
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measurements), employing information from not only the redundant set of
sensors, but from all other analytically redundant sensors as well. If
a failure occurs, the algorithm uses all available information in producing
a set of maximally informative statistics (the MLR's) which can then be
used to identify the failed sensor. Whereas voting algorithms require at
least three redundant sensors to identify which sensor has failed, the
GLR algorithm uses the analytic redundancy provided by the system model and
measurements from un-like sensors to provide the "third vote."
With the vehicle models we have examined up to this point, we have
seen that there is a delay before velocity sensor and propulsion system
failures can be unambiguously identified - the algorithm cannot initially
distinguish between these two failures. The different forms of action
required in response to these failures make identification delays extremely
undesirable.
We will illustrate how physically redundant sensor measurements can
be used in the GLR algorithm by examining the use of a dual set of velocity
sensor measurements; we will see that the use of the additional velocity
sensor greatly improves the correct identification of and distinguishability
between, velocity sensor and propulsion system failures.
4.5.2 Modelling of Dual Sensors
The effects of a set of dual velocity sensors will be examined via
the use of the vehicle models KC2 and Pitts'.
The measurement equation (4-15) for the modek KC2 is modified to
reflect an additional velocity measurement:
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x (k) 1 0
m
v M,1(k) = 0 1
m,lu [ (]
vm, 2()0 1
x 
(k)
v (k) I n (k)+ n 2(k)
n 3 (k)
where v (k) and v (k) are the dual velocity measurements and the velocity
m,l m,2
sensor noise processes n2 (k) and n3 (k) are assumed to have equal, but mutually
uncorrelated, zero-mean Gaussian statistics, with:
T
R = E [n (k) n(k) =
[0.1
0
-0
0.1
0 0.1
The measurement equation (4-2) from Pitts' vehicle model is similarly
modified:
x (k) 1
v (k) 0
Vm, 2 (k) 0
0 0 x(k)
1 0 v (k)
1 0 a(k)
n (k)
+ n2 (k)I
Sn3 (k)
(4-22)
with the same sensor noise statistics defined above.
4.5.3 Failure Signature
The GLR algorithm can now be applied to the two vehicle models, as
before. However, since the additional measurement increases the dimension
of the output space from two to three dimensions, the failure direction
(4-20)
(4-21)
vectors in output space are re-defined as follows:
f = 0 Position Sensor (i=l)
f= 1 Velocity Sensor 1 (i=2)
-2 
[
f = 0 Velocity Sensor 2 (i=3)
Propulsion system failures will have the same direction in state space
as found in section 4.2.5., but the direction vector will be renumbered
f (i=4).
The Kalman-Bucy filter matrices for the two models are given in
Tables 4.8 and 4.9. Note that the error covariance of the updated state
estimates (diagonal elements of the updated error covariance matrix ,)
have decreased (compared to Tables 4.2 and 4.7) as a result of the ad-
ditional information provided by the second velocity sensor.
The failure signatures, now having three components are shown in
Figures 4.58 and 4.59 for the two vehicle models. The effect of the
redundant velocity sensor is to produce signatures which are unique to
each failure location at every point following the failure. The behavior
of a third component of the signature provides the "third vote" in
distinguishing velocity sensor failures from propulsion system failures.
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Table 4. 8
Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices
Acceleration Command Driven Kinematic Model KC2
Dual Velocity Sensors
K A L M A N F I L T E R-
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.3830425809132850+00
0.931537 369320 263D+0 0
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
9.33305D-01 3.14386D-02
-3.09460D-02 3.81 275D-0 1
KBF FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
6.66946D-02 3.094600-02
3.094600-02 3.07815D-01
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE
7.72119D-04 8.672750-04
8.67275D-04 8.07815D-03
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
0.0
3.09460D-02
3.07815D-01
MATRIX
UPDATED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
6.66946D-04
3.09460D-04
RESIDUAL COV
1.07721D-02
8.672750-04
8.67275D-04
RESIDUAL CDV
9.333050+01
-3.09460D+00
-3.09460D+00
3.09460D-04
3.07815D-03
MATRIX (V) -
8.67275D-04
1.80782D-02
8.07815D-03
8.67275D-04
8.07815D-03
1.80782D-02
MATRIX INVERSE (V-INVERSE) -
-3.094600+00 -3.094600+00
6.921850+01 -3.078150+01
-3.078150+01 6.921850+01
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Table 4.9
Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices;
Pitts' Vehicle Model, Dual Velocity Sensors
F I L T E R
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.331197206172607D-0
0.5319612156653360+0
0.9545701258590290+0
I
0
0
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
9.56146D-01 6.901030-02
-1.04660D-02 6.270300-01
4.74776D-02 -3.28997D+00
KBF FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
4.38540D-02 1.046600-02
1.046600-02 6.19163D-02
-4.74776D-02 3.15103D-02
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.244750-03
1.74480D-02
-6.35246D-02
1.04660D-02
6.191630-02
3.15103D-02
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
4.61390D-04 1.24963D-04 -4.88807D-04
1.24963D-04 7.08165D-04 3.537990-04
-4.88807D-04 3.53799D-04 1.26313D-01
UPDATED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
4.38540D-04
1.04660D-04
-4.74776D-04
RESIDUAL COV
1.04614D-02
1.24963D-04
1.24963D-04
RESIDUAL COV
9.561460+01
-1.04660D+00
-1.04660D+00
1.046600-04
6.19163D-04
3.15103D-04
MATRIX (V) -
1.24963D-04
1.07082D-02
7.08165D-04
-4.74776D-04
3.15103D-04
1.26268D-01
1.24963D-04
7.08165D-04
1.07082D-02
MATRIX INVERSE (V-INVERSE)
-1.046600+00 -1.04660D+00
9.380840+01 -6.191630+00
-6.19163D+00 9.38084D+01
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4.5.4 Performance Results
The failure scenarios described in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 were
repeated, with the addition of a redundant velocity measurement. No
background Gaussian noise was included.
4.5.4.1 Velocity Sensor Bias
Results
Filter residuals from the two vehicle models are shown in Figures
4.60 and 4.61. The residuals produced when only one velocity measurement
was available are reproduced for comparison.
Improvement in the algorithms' ability to identify the true failure
location can be seen in the maximum likelihood ratios, Figures 4.62 and
4.63. Using the dual sensor set, the MLR for the failed velocity sensor,
k*, is initially significantly larger than the propulsion system MLR.
This will improve the performance of the algorithm in that:
1) the probability that the correct failure location is
identified will be higher.
2) the delay until a decision is made as to the failure's
location can be shortened.
Since wrong failure location decisions and/or long detection delays may
have disasterous effects, the improvement will significantly affect
vehicle safety.
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4.5.4.2 Propulsion System Bias
Results
Filter residuals appear in Figures 4.64 and 4.65.
Improvements in failure location identification can be observed in
the likelihood ratios, Figures 4.66 and 4.67, for the propulsion system
failure.
4.5.5 Summary
Physically redundant sensor sets can significantly improve failure
detection and identification. The cost of the additional hardware must
be weighed agains the improvements in detection algorithm performance.
Use of the GLR algorithm with physically redundant sensors has
advantages over simple voting schemes. Information from other analytically
redundant sensors can improve identification of failed members of the
phsyically redundant set. Failures affecting all members of a physically
redundant set can also be detected with the GLR algorithm, whereas voting
methods can not do so.
4.6 Detection of Stuck Outputs and Scale Factors Changes in
Sensors and Actuators
4.6.1 Introduction
We claimed in chapter three that the GLR algorithm, designed for the
detection of additive bias failures, could be applied to the detection of
other types of failures as well. In this section the GLR algorithm's ability
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to detect some of these other failure modes will be demonstrated.
Two of the more subtle failure modes, scale factor change and stuck
sensor/actuator failures, will be examined. The magnitudes of zero-output
and hard-over failures are such that they can easily be detected, and
thus will not be examined in detail.
4.6.2 Stuck Position Sensor Failure
Failures in which the output of a sensor or actuator becomes stuck at
an intermediate level may be difficult to detect, for a sudden jump in the
output is not observed (Figure 2.10). We will begin by examinig a stuck
position sensor.
Scenario
A simulation was performed in which the position sensor remained stuck
at a value of 15 meters on a vehicle travelling at 15m/s. The GLR
algorithm using the four vehicle models, KS1, KCl, KC2, and Pitts, was
evaluated on the data.
Results
The maximum likelihood ratios are shown in Figure 4.68. Using the
models KS1 and KCl, the algorithm detected a failure, but incorrectly
identified its location. With the model KC2, the algorithm detected the
failure and initially identified the location correctly. However, one
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second later the decision was changed and the wrong location identified.
The algorithm with Pitts' model detected the failure and correctly
identified the location.
4.6.3 Stuck Velocity Sensor Failure
Scenario
A simulation was performed in which the velocity sensor remained stuck
at a reading of 15m/s just as the vehicle was commanded to decrease its
velocity from 15m/s to 12m/s. Commanded, actual, and measured velocities
are shown in Figure 4.69. The vehicle control system, believing the
vehicle to be travelling constantly at 15m/s, continues to apply increasingly
smaller voltages to the motor, which causes the vehicle to undershoot the
commanded velocity.
Results
Maximum likelihood ratios using the vehicle models KS1, KC2 and
Pitts, are shown in Figure 4.70. With all three models, the GLR
algorithm detected and identified the failed sensor.
The algorithm's ability to determine the error in the measured
velocity, even when the failure is not a true bias failure, is shown
by the bias magnitude estimates (Figure 4.71) produced by the algorithm
using KSl. The estimate of the bias size, E, could be subtracted from
the velocity measurement to estimate the vehicle's true velocity.
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4.6.4 Stuck PCU (Motor Drive Voltage Actuator)
Should the power conditioning unit fail in an "ON" state, es-
sentially operating open-loop from the control system, the results would
be catastrophic if the failure not detected.
Scenario
A simulation was performed in which the voltage applied to the motor
remained at a constant value of 145 volts, independent of the voltage
command. The vehicle remained at a constant velocity of 15m/s, although
it was commanded to decelerate to 12m/s. The commanded and actual velocities
are shown in Figure 4.72.
Results
Maximum likelihood ratios are shown in Figure 4.73. The algorithm
using the kinematic sensor model KS1 did not detect the failure since the
propulsion system is not modelled. The algorithm using the models KCl,
KC2, and Pitts was able to detect the failure and identify its location.
The use of Pitts' vehicle model clearly produced the best detection
performance.
4.6.5. Velocity Sensor Scale Factor Change
At a constant velocity, a sudden scale factor change in the velocity
sensor would appear identical to a bias failure, which we have already
examined. Much more subtle is a scale factor change which occurs before
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a vehicle at rest begins to accelerate, as a sudden jump is not observed
in the output.
Scenario
The gain of the velocity sensor was decreased 10% from 1.0 to 0.9. The
vehicle was commanded at time 1.0 sec to accelerate at service limits.
Commanded, measured, and actual velocities are shown in Figure 4.74.
Results
The GLR algorithm using the models KS1, KC2 and Pitts' was run on the
data. KC1 was not used as the velocity sensor is not modelled. The
likelihood ratios for a failed velocity sensor (Figure 4.75) reach significant
values by the time the vehicle has reached a velocity of 3m/s. Using Pitts'
model produced the best failure location identification results, as the
likelihood ratios for the other possible failure locations remain small.
This is an example of the increased detection ability afforded by more
detailed models.
4.6.6. PCU (Voltage Actuator) Scale Factor Change
Scenario
PCU gain was changed to be 90% of its normal value. Initially at
rest, at time 1.0s the vehicle was commanded to accelerate at service limits.
Commanded and actual velocities are shown in Figure 4.76.
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Results
The algorithm using KCl, the kinematic model driven by the velocity
command, detected and identified the failure location (Figure 4.77). The
likelihood ratio continues to grow throughout the maneuver. Using KC2, the
kinematic model driven by the acceleration command, however, the algorithm
produced a likelihood ratio which peaks 1.5 seconds after the maneuver is
begun, and then decays.
The differences in the behavior of the two likelihood ratios using the
two different vehicle models can be explained. by examining the filter
residuals, Figure 4.78. The signature of the failure remains continuously
visible in the residuals using the velocity command driven model, as there
is a continued discrepancy between commanded and actual velocity.
With the acceleration command driven model, the failure signature
appears only temporarily.
This example illustrates how the same failure can produce signatures
with significantly different characteristics depending on model choices.
We thus see the key role system model choice plays in detection algorithm
design to achieve desired performance goals.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, the GLR method has been applied to an AGT vehicle for
on-board detection of position sensor, velocity sensor, and propulsion
system failures.
-176-
KS1
Position Sensor
Velocity Sensor
t =*
+ . I I I +
+4.0 +5&0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0
.-
KC1
i a + I I
+4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0
Position Sensor
Velocity Sensor
3 t Propulsion Sys.
- - -2
+1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0
t* : Position Sensor
t* ; Velocity Sensor
. - * : Propulsion Sys.
t3 -
- -- -- -
......................-.......-----------------------
q
+ .I I
+1.0 +2.0 +3,0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0
Figure 4.77
Maximum Likelihood Ratics, PCU Scalo Factor Chanqe
-177-
'0 1
0
0
A
0.
9
I I I
+1 .0 +2.0 +3.0
75.,-
t* , Poo Sensor
t' ; Propulsion2
80
0 .
8
I I I
+1 .0 +2.0 +3.0
KC2
5000.
I8A
0.
+9.0
Pitts
t;
---------------------
---------------------------
..................... ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Yi : Position Residual
-- YI
I I I
+1.0 +2.0 +3.0
I. I I + +
+4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0
KC1
.04
Y
-------------------------------------------- ----- 
---------------
Y Yf s Position Residual2
Y2 ; Velocity Residual
0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0
KC2
Figure 4.78
Residuals, PCU Scale Factor Change; KC1, KC2
-178-
0.
.25
8 +9.0
0.
40
r,
C
'4
C,
4.)
C,
-. 16
We have seen that detection of these failures is feasible, and can be
done in the presence of random plant and sensor noise.
External disturbances, such as winds and grades, pose problems for the
detection system, since their effect on the vehicles' transient response
is qualitatively similar to propulsion failures.
Tradeoffs between detection probability, false alarm probability, time
to detect, and failure location identification have been established. We
have concentrated on how the choice of a system model and how the use of
physically redundant sensors affect these tradeoffs.
It has been demonstrated that as model complexity is increased, so is
false alarm sensitivity to unmodelled effects and external disturbances.
Simple vehicle models employing kinematic relationships have been shown to
provide acceptable detection ability coupled with a decreased sensitivity
to external disturbances.
Physically redundant sensor pairs have been shown to improve algorithm
performance by decreasing failure identification delay.
Finally, the GLR algorithm, designed for the detection of additive
bias failures (which cause sudden jumps in measurements or actuators),
can be shown to detect failures involving sensor or actuator scale factor
changes or stuck outputs (whose effects appear gradually).
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CHAPTER V
FAILURE DETECTION IN VEHICLE-FOLLOWER SYSTEMS
5.1 Introduction
In chapter four, vehicle failure detection strategies have been examined
involving single vehicles only; the methods explored would be implemented on-
board the vehicle for detection of position sensor, velocity sensor, and
propulsion system failures. It was assumed that the only communication the
vehicle had with the outside world was the acquisition of control commands from
a wayside computer.
In practice, however, proposed AGT vehicle systems will require vehicles
to travel in closely packed strings, with inter-vehicle headways on the order
of one-half second. Such short headways are required to permit large passenger
throughput, especially in personal rapid transit (PRT) class systems where
vehicle capacity may be limited to four to six persons. In short-headway
systems, much of the vehicle longitudinal control functions will be performed
on-board the vehicle, and will likely be based on vehicle-follower control
strategies [8, 9, 10, 22, 23, 26]. Vehicle-follower control requires accurate
measurement of inter-vehicle spacing and relative velocity, and will thus re-
quire communication of vehicle states from one vehicle to another (possibly
via the wayside) or the use of an inter-vehicle spacing sensor on-board each
vehicle; such spacing sensors may employ radar, sonor, microwave or laser
technologies. The control system requires the determination of inter-vehicle
spacing with a high degree of reliability; thus adequate redundancy must be
designed into the system, and a method implemented for failure detection.
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In this chapter, we extend the GLR methodology for failure detection to
a vehicle-follower system. The GLR algorithm will be applied to detection of
failures in the spacing sensor and in measurements communicated to each vehicle
from its predecessor. This will be done by augmenting a model of a single
vehicle with a simple kinematic model of the vehicle it is following. Using
this dual-vehicle model in the GLR algorithm, the detection of failures will
be tested.
First, however, we will present a brief discussion of vehicle-follower
control strategies and give the details of a specific operating policy to
provide the background for our experiments.
5.2 Vehicle-Follower Longitudinal Control
In a vehicle-follower longitudinal control scheme, AGT vehicles travel
in closely packed strings with each vehicle following the preceeding vehicle
according to a specific operating policy. A wayside controller communicates
control commands to the lead vehicle, and can thus control the behavior of the
string. Vehicles may merge into or diverge from the string at intersections
along the guideway.
A number of operating policies for maintaining inter-vehicle spacing
have been developed I26]. These include constant-separation, constant-time
headway, constant K-factor and safe-approach policies. The GLR method for
failure detection can be used in conjunctionwith any of these policies.
To illustrate how the GLR algorithm can be applied to vehicle-follower
control systems, the safe-approach control method of 126] has been chosen as
the operating policy to be used in the simulations.
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The safe-approach method can be viewed as a composite steady-state
operating policy combining constant-time headway and constant-separation policies.
The unique feature of the strategey is the way in which it governs the speed
of a vehicle approaching its predecessor with the intention of achieving steady-
state spacing. The overtaking vehicle is slowed down as it approaches proper
spacing to insure that it can stop safely should the preceeding vehicle stop
on service or emergency limits at any time.
The safe-approach controller on-board each vehicle employs velocity and
spacing measurements to generate the vehicle's velocity command in accordance
with the safe-approach policy, as follows:
S - S.
min
v = v + (5-1)
2 (Cl)v + C2 + C32
with
2 2
s = Cl (v - v ) + C2 (v -v) + C3 v + C4 (5-2)
min 2 1 2 1 2
where v is the following vehicle's velocity command, v 2 is the following
c2
vehicle's velocity, v, is the preceeding vehicle's velocity, s is front-to-
front spacing and Cl, C2, C3 and C4 are constants. Values for these constants
can be found in 126]. A block diagram of this "velocity command generator"
is shown in Figure 5.1. The velocity command computed by the safe-approach
velocity command generator can be sent to the velocity regulator of Figure
2.3 to implement the command. In practice, a blending function can be used
to blend the velocity commands during transitions for wayside control to
vehicle-following mode.
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5.3 Application of the GLR Method
5.3.1 Modelling Vehicles in Vehicle-Following Mode
The single vehicle models examined in chapter four can be augmented
to include a description of each vehicle's predecessor. The GLR algorithm
can then be applied to this dual-vehicle model and implemented on-board
each vehicle for detection of failures.
Complexity of the preceeding vehicle's model, which will be implemented
in the detection algorithm on-board the following vehicle, will depend on
the amount of information available to each vehicle about its predecessor.
In this study, we assume each vehicle has a spacing sensor, and in
addition, receives communicated measurements of its predecessor's position
and velocity. The spacing measurement is used directly in the vehicle-
follower control calculations; should a failure be detected in this sensor,
spacing is computed via the difference of each vehicle's position measurement.
If a subsequent failure is detected in a position sensor, the estimated
failure magnitude provided by the GLR algorithm could be used to permit
the vehicle to continue operation, although in a degraded mode, so as not
to block the guideway. This configuration of sensors and communicated
measurements thus gives each vehicle (fail-operational)2 capability. In
addition, it permits an accurate kinematic model of the preceeding vehicle
to be used in the failure detection algorithm.
For illustration purposes, we will use the kinematic sensor driven
model KSl to represent the dynamics of each vehicle. This model can be
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augmented with a similar model of each vehicle's predecessor, as follows:
Veh. Model x(t) 1 F [L) + 1 0 v (t) +n (t)
Prec. Veh. x (t) j 0 0 x (t) 0 1 jv m(t n 2 1p(t)
Model measurement equati2,p
with the measurement equation:
s (t)
m
xm(t) _= ~ )
x (t) 01 x (t)
m,p - - p -l
n (t)3
+ nl (t) -
n (t
L 1,p -
where the state variables are the vehicles' positions, the velocity
measurements are used to drive the state equation, and n. (t) are sensor
noise processes. We assume that the spacing measurement s (t) is front-
to-front spacing.
Discretization of the above model with a sampling interval of
At = 0.1 seconds produces:
x(k+1) -1 0 x (k) 0.1 0 v M(k) n 2(k)
+)m
11k+) 0 1 1x1(k)1 + 11 0.1111v(k)1 n2. (kjpkm,p 2,p
s (k)
m
x (k)
m
x (k)
SMp J
ln -l-3 (k)
= 1 0 x (k) + n (k)
0 1j Lkj n1, (k)
- - _-
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(5-4)
(5-5)
(5-6)
The sensor noise processes are assumed to be uncorrelated, zero-mean,
Gaussian, with la levels given in Table 5.1.
Using the above model which uses only the kinematic relationships among
the sensors, the GLR algorithm will not be sensitive to external disturbances
or modelling errors, and can be expected to have low false alarm rates.
5.3.2 GLR Algorithm Design
The design of the GLR algorithm is done as before, following the steps
outlined in chapter three.
Kalman-Bucy filter gain and covariance matrices are given in
Table 5.2.
Failure direction vectors are chosen and indexed for the following
possible failure locations:
f = 0 (e Output-Space) Spacing Sensor
f 0 (e Output-Space) Preceeding Vehicle
[2 Position Sensor
0
f =1 (e Output-Space) Position Sensor
-:-3
0
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Table 5.1
Dual Vehicle Model Sensor Noise Characterization
Sensor Noise l Levels
nI(k) n2(k) n 3 (k)
Position Velocity Spacing
Preceeding Vehicle
Following Vehicle :
0. 1 m
0. 1 m
0. 1 m/s -
0.1 m/s 0.01 m
Noise Covariance Matrices For Kalman-Bucy Filter
R = E[ (n 3 n 1 n 1 ) T (n 3 n 1 n )
1. Oe-4
0.
0.
1.Oe-2
0.
)
1.0e-2]
Q = (0.1)2 E[ (n2 n2,p T(n2 n2,p)
[1.Oe-4
0. 1.Oe-4I
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Table 5.2
Kalman-Bucy Filter Matrices; Dual Vehicle Model
F I L T E R
CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES
REAL PART
0.267178087374890D+00
0.904875078027504D+00
CLOSED LOOP MATRIX
5.860270-01 3.188480-01
3.188480-01 5.860270-01
KBF FILTER GAIN MATRIX H
3.64560-01 4.938540-02
-3.64583D-01 4.57395D-02
IMAGINARY PART
0.0
0.0
4.57395D-02
4.93854D-02
PREDICTED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
5.93854D-04 4.57395D-04
4.573950-04 5.93U540-04
UPDATED ERROR COVARIANCE MATRIX
4.938.,40-04
4.573J50-04
RESIDUAL CCV
3.729160-04
1.364590-04
-1 .364590-04
RESIDUAL COV
2.70824D+03
-3.6450380-01
3.645880+01
4.573950-04
4.933540-04
MATRIX (V) -
1.364590-04 -1.364590-04
1.059390-02 4.57395D-04
4.57395D-04 1.059390-02
MATRIX INVERSE (V-INVERSE) -
-3.645880+01 3.64588D+01
9.506150+01 -4.57395D+00
-4.573950+00 9.50615D+01
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0
The failure signatures for each of these failure locations are shown
in Figure 5.2. The behavior of the failure signatures is unique for each
of the possible failures.
The information measures a. (r) for each of the possible failure
locations are shown in Figure 5.3. Observe that a relatively large
amount of information about a spacing sensor failure is available im-
mediately following the occurence of the failure.
5.4 Performance Results
Simulations were performed of a pair of AGT vehicles with the first
under wayside control and the second following the first. Gaussian noise
was not included in the simulations.
Initially, both vehicles are at a velocity of 15m/s, and at steady-
state front-to-front spacing of 7.7 meters. Vehicle length is assumed
to be 2.5 m; thus 5.2 meters actually separate the vehicles.
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5.4.1 Line-Speed Change Maneuver
A vehicle-following maneuver was performed to test the operation of
the safe-approach controller and to examine the detection algorithm's
sensitivity to a maneuver.
Scenario
The preceeding vehicle was commanded to accelerate from 15m/s to
18m/s at service limits. Behavior of the two vehicles is shown in
Figure 5.4.
Results
Likelihood ratios, Figure 5.5, reach peak values of 5.0 during the
period of maximum acceleration. The increase of the MLR's is due solely
to the effects of sampling.
The controller performs as expected, and the maneuver will not cause
false alarms.
5.4.2 Preceeding Vehicle Position Sensor Bias
Scenario
A 1.0m bias appears in the preceeding vehicle's position measurement
received by the following vehicle at time e=l.os. The bias could be
caused by a failure of the sensor or a component of the communication link.
Since the measurement is not used directly in control law calculations, the
failure does not affect vehicle behavior.
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Results
The failure is detected instantly, and the location identified without
delay or ambiguity by the detection algorithm on-board the following vehicle.
The likelihood ratio, Z2 , for the preceeding vehicle's position sensor
(Figure 5.6) grows until the failure time leaves the 3.0 second detection
window. The likelihood ratio then decays, and soon thereafter, the algorithm
becomes unable to determine whether the failure is in the preceeding or the
following vehicle's position measurement. In this case, the size of the
detection window is critical to the identification of the failure's
location; detection and identification must be accomplished before 0 leaves
the window.
5.4.3 Preceeding Vehicle Velocity Sensor Bias
Scenario
At time O=l.Os a 1.0m/s bias developes in the preceeding vehicle's
velocity sensor. On-board the preceeding vehicle, the velocity regulator,
observing what it believes to be an overspeed conditions, slows the
vehicle (as in section 4.3.2). On-board the following vehicle, the safe-
approach controller, believing the preceeding vehicle to now be at a
velocity of 16m/s, commands the vehicle to increase its velocity, as shown
in Figure 5.7. Vehicle spacing decreases, and if corrective action is
not taken, the vehicles collide 7.0 seconds following the failure.
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Results
Likelihood ratios are shown in Figure 5.8. The MLR for the failed
sensor, k* , jumps to a value of 27 at the occurrence of the failure, has
reached 260 one-half second later, and is near 3000 by the time 0 has left
the detection window. A delay is observed, however, before the location
of the failure can be confidently decided. The standard deviation of
z*, is shown in the figure; it is not unti 1.0s following the failure that4
k* leaves the la region around k* . If the failure decision was deferred5 4
until this point, vehicle spacing will have decreased only slightly more
than a meter, from 7.7 to 6.5 meters.
Since the likelihood ratios are proportional to 2, and their
standard deviations proportional to 3, there will be even less of a delay
before the location of larger failures can be confidently determined.
Summary of Results
1) If undetected, the failure will cause a collision.
2) The likelihood ratio k* grows linearly following the
failure.
3) X* remains large even after 0 has left the detection4
window.
4) Although £* always remains larger than the other 4LR's,4
there is a slight delay before the algorithm confidently
determines whether the failed velocity sensor is on-board
the following or preceeding vehicle. The length of this
delay will be less for larger magnitude failures.
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5.4.4 Spacing Sensor Bias Failure
Failures in the spacing sensor must be quickly and accurately detected,
as this sensor is critical to vehicle safety.
Scenario
At time 0=1.0s, a 1 meter bias develops in the following vehicle's
spacing sensor, so that measured spacing jumps from 7.7 to 8.7 meters.
The safe-approach controller commands the following vehicle to increase
velocity to close the observed gap (Figure 5.9). Actual spacing begins
decreasing past the safe distance. Should the preceeding vehicle now
execute an emergency stop, the vehicles may collide.
Results
At time 0, the spacing sensor likelihood ratio 9* immediately jumps1
to a value near 3000 (Figure 5.10). However, there is an apparent
ambiguity whether the location of the failure is the spacing sensor or one
of the velocity sensors, as k* and 9* are within one standard deviation4 5
of k*.1,
As another observation is made, the algorithm identifies the failed
spacing sensor, and k* and Z* decay rapidly.4 5
The spacing sensor MLR, 9i, continues increasing until the failure
time 0 leaves the detection window, at which time Z* falls below Z* and1 2
2*. This illustrates the importance of the first few residuals which3
are observed after the failure, for without them, the failure signature
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appears to the algorithm as a position sensor failure.
Summary of Results.
1) The spacing sensor bias causes safe spacing limits
to be violated.
2) Detection of the failure is instantaneous, due to
the redundancy afforded by each vehicles position
measurement and the spacing sensor.
3) Correct and confident identification occurs within
0.2 sec.
4) The failure location will be incorrectly identified
once the failure time leaves the detection window.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, the GLR method has been applied to failure detection
in a vehicle-follower AGT system. An algorithm has been designed for
implementation on-board each vehicle for detection of failures in the
vehicle's sensors, as well as detection of errors in state measurements
received from its predecessor, as shown in Figure 5.11.
The algorithm has been shown to be able to detect and identify bias
failures in the preceeding vehicle's communicated position and velocity
measurements, and in the spacing sensor. These failures, if undetected,
are likely to cause collisions.
The algorithm presented is applicable to any vehicle and any vehicle-
following operating policy, as the vehicle model used employs only the
kinematic relationships among the vehicles' sensors.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Overview
The successful implementation of proposed automated guideway transit
(AGT) transportation systems will depend on the development of safe and
reliable longitudinal control systems. In high capacity AGT systems having
headways on the order of one-half second, methods for the rapid detection
of, and response to, vehicle failures are critically important to passenger
safety. The success of these methods will play a part in determining
achievable headways having adequate margins of safety.
Vehicle-follower control schemes, capable of providing short vehicle
headways, necessary for high capacity, require accurate and reliable measure-
ments of vehicle states (e.g. position, velocity, inter-vehicle spacing);
detection of failures, especially in vehicle sensors, takes on ever
increasing importance in such systems.
In this study, a methodology has been developed for the detection and
identification of vehicle failures in an AGT system. This approach, based
on the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) algorithm, permits rapid detec-
tion of sensor and propulsion system failures. We have applied the method
both to a single AGT vehicle operating in isolation and to a pair of
vehicles operating at close headway governed by a vehicle-follower control
law.
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The GLR method has been previously proven successful in detecting
sudden events (e.g., failures) in a variety of applications. It is an
easily implemented software algorithm which processes data in real-time to
detect the occurrence of sudden departures of an actual system from a simple,
idealized linear model. The difference between observations of the actual
system and predictions made by the model, called the residual, has a
characteristic behavior when failures occur which is unique to different
failures in various components of the system. By looking for these charac-
teristic behaviors (failure signatures) in the retained past history of
observations (detection "window") the algorithm detects the occurrence of
failures. A set of maximally informative statistics (likelihood ratios)
are generated which represent the likelihood that one of these failure sig-
natures has been found. These likelihood ratios can be used in a decision
rule with parametric thresholds to make detection decisions.
The GLR approach for failure detection in AGT vehicles has many
advantages over both traditional methods for reliability enhancement (e.g.
voting among redundant. sets of instruments) and new methodsrecently
proposed (the "detection filter" approach by Vander Velde at M.I.T.).
This approach is unique in that in addition to rapid failure detection
capability the algorithm:
1) provides optimal estimates (using modern system-theoretic
techniques) of key system variables which can be fed directly
to the longitudinal control system when there are no
failures,
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2) provides analytic redundancy for key sensors to save
hardware costs, and most importantly,
3) allows for continued (possibly degraded) operation in
the presence of certain failures by providing estimates
of the extent (magnitude) of the failure; these estimates
can be employed by the control system to compensate for
the effect of the failure on the vehicle.
6.2 Research Summary and Discussion of Results
In this study, an idealized model of an AGT vehicle was developed.
Possible failure modes for the vehicle's sensors and propulsion system
were identified and a simple model to describe these failures developed.
The GLR algorithm was designed for the detection of position sensor,
velocity sensor, and propulsion system failures in the vehicle, and tested
using computer simulations. Rapid detection of a variety of failure types
was shown to be feasible, and could be performed in the presence of
Gaussian sensor and vehicle plant noise. The effects on the detector
algorithm of vehicle maneuvers and wind and grade forces were studied, as
these disturbances may cause false alarms. It was shown that with
systematic algorithm design tradeoffs false alarms from these external
disturbances can be avoided.
After examination of detection algorithm issues for an isolated
vehicle, the GLR method was applied to detection of failures in vehicles
operating at close headways operating under a vehicle-follower control
-207-
system. Using simulations of a vehicle pair, it was shown that failures
in the spacing sensor and errors in measurements communicated from the
preceeding vehicle could rapidly be detected. Without detection of these
faults, collisions of the vehicles occurred.
In both the single and dual vehicle tests, the GLR algorithm provided
accurate estimates of the failure time and the magnitude of the error;
these estimates would be used by the control system to compensate for the
failure, thus permitting a fail-operational response.
The concentration of the study has been on the methodological algorithm
approach, and not on the issues of developing specific decision rules or
failure compensation schemes. Wherever possible we have emphasized the
qualitative aspects of the results, to emphasize the generality of the ap-
proach and how the results could be applied to automated transit systems
different than the examples studied.
Important measures to characterize failure detection algorithms in
general and the GLR approach in particular were found to be
1) detection feasibility;
2) false alarm characteristics;
3) detection delay;
4) failure location identification ability.
These performance attributes when considered in the framework of the GLR
algorithm were found to be closely related to:
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1) choice of vehicle model used in the algorithm;
2) sensor configurations employed;
3) history of system observations retained for processing
in the detection algorithm (length of detection window);
4) settings of detection thresholds and ratio of modelled
plant to sensor noise intensities.
The impact of each of these factors on performance is summarized below.
Vehicle Model Used in Detection Algorithm
The vehicle model used in the GLR algorithm critically affects detec-
tion performance. We have found that complex (detailed) models which
contain uncertain parameters, although providing the best detection ability
with minimum detection delay under ideal conditions, are sensitive to
external disturbances and unmodelled effects and may thus produce unac-
ceptable false alarm rates.
We found that simplified models which model kinematic relationships
are less sensitive to external (wind and grade) disturbances since the
kinematic relationships are known with certainty and continue to accurately
model the vehicle's behavior even in the presence of disturbances. Use of
these models in the algorithm produces lower false alarm rates and still
permits failure detection capability, although a degradation in performance
was observed in some cases (e.g. difficulty identifying a stuck position
sensor). Using models which describe only the kinematic relationships
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between sensor outputs was found to eliminate false alarms from wind
and grade altogether, and still allowed detection of sensor failures.
However, propulsion system failures could not be detected since the
propulsion dynamics are not modelled.
Sensor Configurations
The GLR approach does not require physically redundant sensors for
failure detection, as the algorithm provides analytic redundancy by em-
ploying measurements from other, analytically related, sensors, However,
the use of physically redundant sensor sets in conjunction with the
algorithm will always improve failure identification. We found that
although detection of certain failures may not be improved, the use of
dual-redundant sensors significantly reduces the delay before the location
of the failure can be unambiguously identified.
Although traditional voting algorithms require three identical sensors
to permit fail-operational/fail-safe capability following two subsequent
sensor failures, only dual-redundant sensors are required to permit an
equal failure response capability using the GLR algorithm.
Detection Window
In the framework of the GLR algorithm, the "detection window" re-
presents a period in time of past system observations which are retained
for processing by the detection algorithm; this window is searched for
the onset of a failure signature. The length and location of this
window relative to "current" time plays a key role in algorithm performance.
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It was found that certain failures produce signatures which grow with
time; longer or delayed windows will assure eventual detection of these
failures, although with possible delays. Other failures produce signatures
which decay with time, longer windows will not improve detection of these
failures. Tradeoffs between computational burden and detection window
length also clearly exist.
Decision thresholds; Noise intensities
The sensitivity of the detection algorithm to failures and disturbances
can be adjusted parametrically to optimize false alarms vs. detection
probabilities. Although detailed decision rules were not developed in
this study, decision rule thresholds can be selected in a systematic
fashion to facilitate performance tradeoffs.
In addition, the relative detection sensitivity to failures which
occur in sensors vs. vehicle dynamics (propulsion) can be parametrically
adjusted via the relative intensities of the modelled plant and sensor
noise used in algorithm design; the modelled noise intensities in essence
set the detection algorithm's bandwidth, which affects false alarms
sensitivity to background noise and detection speed.
6.3 Computational Complexity
The scope and complexity of the calculations required for the a-priori
design of the GLR algorithm for a specific implementation requires the use
of a general purpose computer, However, the calculations required during
on-line operation of the algorithm can be minimal, as recursive expressions
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can easily be found for these computations. The detection algorithm should
thus be implemented in an on-board computer (e.g. a micro-processor based
architecture). In addition, the modular nature of the GLR algorithm suggests
parallel processing implementations.
To give the reader a feel for the simplicity of the on-line calculations,
the algorithm was implemented in this study (ignoring I/0) in approximately
60 FORTRAN statements, most of which were devoted to matrix operations.
For an algorithm design having n state variables, p measurements,
q possible failure locations and r data points in the detection window, each
time step of algorithm operation requires:
multiplications additions
2 2
Kalman-Bucy n +2nm+2n n +2np+n+p
Filter Update
Likelihood Ratio q(p+2)r q(p)r
Computation
For the three state vehicle model and the full three second detection
window used in this study, 400 multiplications and 212 additions were
required at each time step.
6.4 Areas for Future Research
Additional research is needed for the development and testing of
decision rules and methods for coupling the detection algorithm to the
control system. An adaptive filtering scheme employing the GLR algorithm
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for failure compensation is given in [32]. Testing of such approaches in
the context of AGT vehicle systems is still required.
In this study, the GLR algorithm was tested on simulated data from
an idealized AGT vehicle model. Analysis and testing of the approach on
actual recorded data is still necessary.
The GLR algorithm for failure detection can provide significant
improvements in vehicle safety and reliability. The resulting reliability
enhancement, however, is limited by the reliability of the computer hardware
implementing the algorithm. Although the state-of-the-art in digital
hardware reliability is ever-increasing, this issue must still be addressed.
Processor hardware failures may either cause failure detection capability
to be lost, or may themselves produce. false detection alarms needlessly
hindering efficient operation of the vehicle system; processor failures
(e.g. memory errors causing algorithm constants to be zeroed or biased,
A/D converter faults, etc.) could appear to the GLR algorithm as vehicle
sensor failures.
Although we have briefly examined possible methods for detection of
processor faults within the framework of the GLR algorithm (e.g. the de-
velopment of "processor failure signatures"), it appears that detection of
these failures is best left to redundant, fault-tolerant computer
architectures [40,41]. Additional study is clearly needed, however.
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APPENDIX A
NOTATION
Chapters are divided into sections, which are numbered 1.1, 1.2, etc.
Sections may be divided into subsections, numbered 1.1.1., 1.1.2., etc.,
and so on. Figures, tables, and equations are numbered consecutively
within each chapter, prefixed by the chapter number. Equation numbers ap-
pear in parentheses ( ), and references in brackets [ ].
Vectors are denoted by lower case letters and are underlined, e.g.,
x. Scalars are lower case but not underlined. Matrices are written as
uppercase letters. These rules are occasionally broken (e.g. the constants
C , C , K , Cl, C2, C3, C4) to be consistent with other sources.O l M
Variables with a (A), e.g., x, are estimates of the variables true
value.
Notation for Mathematical Operations
x transpose of the vector x
AT transpose of the matrix A
A inverse of the square matrix A
x(t) time derivative of the time-varying vector x(t)
max the maximum with respect to 0
0
arg max the value of 0 which produces the maximum
e
-214-
Abbreviations
AGT Automated Guideway Transit
GLR Generalized Likelihood Ratio
KCl Kinematic Velocity Command Driven
Vehicle Model
KC2 Kinematic Acceleration Command Driven
Vehicle Model
KS1 Kinematic Sensor Driven Vehicle Model
LR Likelihood Ratio
MLR Maximum Likelihood Ratio
PCU Power Conditioning Unit
Pitts Refers to Vehicle and DC Motor Model
by Pitts [19]
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APPENDIX B
DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUOUS-TIME SYSTEMS
Given the linear continuous-time stochastic system:
x(t) = Axx(t) + B u(t) + w3 (t)
C- -c
z(t) = Cx(t) + n (t)
_ - -c
(B-1)
(B- 2)
where the zero mean white noise processes wc (t) and nc (t) have covariance
matrices 9 = QT > 0 and R = RT > 0 a statistically equivalent discrete-
time linear stochastic system can be computed:
x(k+At) Ox(k) + Buk) + W(k)
z(k) = Cx(k) + n(k)
(B-3)
(B-4)k=0, At, 2*At,....
where the zero mean, uncorrelated, Gaussian processes w(k) and n(k) have
T T
covariance matrices Q = Q > 0 and R = R > 0, and
= eAAt
At
B =(f
0
At
Q =f
e do I B) c
T
e Q e doC
If the continuous-time control u(t) is not held piecewise constant
over the interval (k, k + At), the system (B-3), (B-4) will contain errors
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(B-5)
(B-6)
(B-7)
caused by the effects of sampling u(t) .
The matrix exponentials can be computed on a digital computer
using a Pade approximation [42].
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APPENDIX C
AGT VEHICLE SIMULATOR AND GLR ALGORITHM PROGRAMS
This appendix briefly describes the computer programs used to simulate
the behavior of an AGT vehicle and to test the GLR algorithm.
A FORTRAN program was written to simulate the general, linear,
discrete-time system:
x(k+l) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Lw(k) + f (k) (C-l)
z(k) = Cx(k) + Du(k) + v(k) + f (k) (C-2)
with state vector x, controls u, measurements z, Gaussian noise processes
w and v, and failure vectors f and f
This program was used to simulate the vehicle with the structure given
in Figure 4.7, the dynamics of Figure 2.7, and the controller of Figure 2.3.
The dual-vehicle simulations used the controller of Figure 5.1.
Plant noise, wind and grade were added via the disturbance process
w(t), (Figure 2.7), with
-w(t) = w (t) + w (t) + w (t)
n g w
where w is a Gaussian noise process, w is the effect of grade, and w
n g w
the effect of wind. The grade and wind disturbances are given by
w (t) = C 2Wg(t) + C3 Wc (t) (C-3)
w (t) = C W v (t) + C W v (t) (C-4)
w2 Dw 3D w
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where
W = Vehicle Weight
- f M =(9.807)M
g ray
g(t) = percent grade (e.g. .06=6% uphill grade)
v (t) = wind velocity (headwind positive)
W = linearized drag
= PACD (V+V )sgn(V+V )D w w
V = nominal vehicle velocity
V = nominal wind velocity
C _ w )2 R(r)2 J
2 n J TL
T
r2
C = w 1
3 ( J
T
r 2
J = J + M -
T jM Mn
)
Values used are given in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
The system (C-1) and (C-2) was entered in the continuous-time form,
and the equivalent discrete-time system computed, using the method given
in Appendix B. Simulated data was written to disk files for storage and
processing.
The GLR algorithm was implemented in a FORTRAN program which processed
the simulated data from the AGT vehicle simulator.
Both programs were run on the MIT-IPS IBM 370 under VM/370 - CMS.
-219-
REFERENCES
(1) Strickland, L.R., 'Automated Guideway Transit Technology Overview',
US DOT Report UMTA-VA-06-0041-78-l, Feb. 1978
(2) Anderson, J.H. and E.T.Powner, 'Optimal Digital Computer Control of
Cascaded Vehicles in High-Speed Transit Systems in the Presence
of Measurement Noise and Stochastic Input Disturbances',
Transportation Research, Vol. 4, pp 185-198, 1970.
(3) Athans, M., W.S. Levine and A.H. Levis, 'On the Optimal and Suboptimal
Position and Velocity Control of a String of High-Speed Moving
Trains', Electronic Systems Laboratory Report, M.I.T., Nov. 1966.
(4) Athans, M., and A.H. Levis, 'Sampled-Data Control of High-Speed
Trains', Electronic Systems Laboratory Report, M.I.T., Jan. 1968.
(5) Brown, S.J. Jr., E.J. Hinman, E.E. Mooring, and G.L. Pitts, 'Control
Concepts for the Morgantown Project', Applied Physics Laboratory,
John Hopkins University (APL/JHU), CP 007/TPR 022, Aug. 1971.
(6) Brown, S.J. Jr., 'Characteristics of a Linear Regulator Control Law
for Vehicles in an Automatic Transit System', APL/JHU, CP 009/TPR
020, Jan. 1972.
(7) Brown, S.J. Jr., 'Point-Follower Automatic Vehicle Control; A
General Analysis', APL/JHU, CP 057/TPR 025, May 1977.
(8) Caudill, R.J., and W.L. Garrard, 'Vehicle Follower Longitudinal Control
for Automated Guideway Transit Vehicles', Univ. of Minn., Feb. 1977.
(9) Chiu, H.Y. G.B. Stupp, Jr., and S.J. Brown, Jr., 'Vehicle Follower
Controls for Short Headway AGT Systems; Functional Analysis and
Cenceptual Designs', APL/JHU, CP 051/TPR 035, Dec. 1976
(10) Chiu, H.Y., G.B. Stupp, Jr., and S.J. Brown, Jr., 'Vehicle Follower
Control with Variable-Gains for Short Headway AUtomated Guideway
Transit Systems' (APL/JHU), J. of Dyn. Sys, Meas., and Cntrl,
pp. 183-189, Sept. 1977.
(11) Chu, K.C., 'Decentralized Control of High Speed Vehicular Strings',
Transportation Science, Vol. 8, No. 4, Nov. 1974.
(12) Garrard, W.L., G.R. Hand and R. Raemer, 'Suboptimal Feedback Control
of a String of Vehicles Moving in a Single Guideway', Transpn.
Res., Vol. 6, pp. 197-210, 1972
(13) Garrard, W.L., and A.L. Kornhauser, 'Use of State Observers in the
Optimal Feedback Control of Automated Transit Vehicles', J. of Dyn
Sys, Meas, and Cntrl, Vol. 95, No. 2. June 1973.
-220-
(14) Garrard, W.L. , and A.L. Kornhauser, 'Design of Optimal
Feedback Systems for Longitudinal Control of Automated Transit
Vehicles', Transpn. Res., Vol. 7, pp. 125-144, 1973.
(15) Hinman, E.J., R.B. McDowell, and R.A. Makofski, 'Control Considerations
for Short Headway AGV Systems', APL/JHU, CP 003/TPR 018, Oct. 1971.
(16) Hinman, E.J., 'Command and Control Studies for Personal Rapid Transit,
Program Status, 1974', APL/JHU, CP 039/TPR 030, April 1975.
(17) Lang, R.P., 'Morgantown Personal Rapit Transit Control System Design
Summary', (Boeing Aerospace Co.) UMTA Report UMTA-MA-06-0048-75-4
Dec. 1975.
(18) Pitts, G.L., 'Augmented Block Guidance for Short Headway Transportation
Systems', APL/JHU, CP 019/TPR 023, Sept. 1972.
(19) Pitts, G.L., 'Control Allocation Investigation: Sampling Rate Selection',
APL/JHU, TIR-009, UMTA-MD-06-0018-74-2, April 1974.
(20) Powner, E.J., J.H. Anderson, and G.H. Qualtrough, 'Optimal Digital
Computer Control of Cascaded Vehicles in High Speed Transportation
Systems', Transpn Res., Vol. 3, pp. 101-112, 1969.
(21) Pue, A.J., 'Implementation Trade-Off Study for a Short Headway AGT System',
APL/JHU, FIC(2)-77-U-013, May 25, 1977.
(22) Pue, A.J., 'A Vehicle Follower Control Approach for Short Headway AGT
Systems', Proc. Conference on AGT Technology Development, Cambridge
Ma., UMTA-MA-06-0048-78-1, 1978.
(23) Pue, A.J., 'A State Constrained Approach to Vehicle-Follower Control
for Short Headway AGT Systems', APL/JHU.
(24) Saridis, G., and Z. Rekasius, 'Design of Approximately Optimal Feedback
Controllers for Systems with Bounded States', IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, Vol. AC-12, No. 4, Aug. 1967.
(25) Schumacher, P.J. 'The Vehicle Control and Reliability Project', (United
Technologies corp., Otis Elevator Co.), Proc. Conf. on AGT
Technology Devel., Camb., Ma. , UMTA-MA-06-0048-78-1, 1978.
(26) Schumacker, P.J., ed., 'Volume 3 Longitudinal Control Analysis and
Design (Part B-PRT Systems)', Vehicle Longitudinal Control and
Reliability Project, Otis Elevator Co., (C.S. Draper Lab,), UMTA-
IT-06-0148-79-8, May 1979.
-221-
(27) Yang, S.C., and W.L. Garrard, 'A Low Sensitivity Modern Approach to the
Longitudinal Control of Automated Transit Vehicles', J. of Dyn. Sys.,
Meas., and Cntrl, Vol. 95, No. 2, June 1974.
(28) VanderVelde, W.E., 'Application of Failure Detection Theory to Reliable
Longitudinal Control of Guideway Vehicles', Dept. of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, M.I.T., March 1979.
(29) Beard, R.V., "Failure Accommodation in Linear Systems Through Self-
Reorganization', Phd Thesis, Dept. of Aero. and Astro., M.I.T.
Feb. 1971.
(30) Jones, H.L., 'Failure Detection in Linear Systems', Phd Thesis, Dept. of
Aero. and Astro., M.I.T., Aug. 1973.
(31) Van Trees, H.L., Detection,Estimation, and Modulation Theory, Part I,
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1971.
(32) Willsky, A.S., and H.L. Jones, "A Generalized Likelihood Ratio Approach
to State Estimation in Linear Systems Subject to Abrupt Changes',
Proc. of the 1974 IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, Pheonix, Ariz.,
November 1974.
(33) Willsky, A.S., and H.L. Jones, 'A Generalized Likelihood Ratio Approach
to the Detection ad Estimation of Jumps in Linear Systems',
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-21, No. 1,
pp. 108-112, Feb. 1976.
(34) Bueno, R., E.Y. Chow, S. Gershwin, and A.S. Willsky, "Research Status
Report to NASA Langley Research Center: A Dual-Mode Generalized
Likelihood Ratio Approach to Self-Reorganizing Digital Flight
Control System Design', Electronic Systems Laboratory Report,
M.I.T., Paper No. P-633, Nov. 1975
(35) Chow, E.Y. , A.S. Willsky, S.B. Gershwin, and P.K. Houpt, 'Dynamic
Detection and Identification of Incidents on Freeways' Vol. IV:
The GLR Method', Electronic Systems Laboratory Report ESL-R-767,
M.I.T., Sept. 1977.
(36) Gustafson, D.E., A,S. Willsky, and J.Y. Wang, "Final Report: Cardiac
Arrythmia Detection ad Classification Through Signal Analysis',
The C.S. Draper Laboratory, Cambridge, MA., Rept. No. R-920r
July 1975.
(37) Jazwinski, A.H., Stochastic Processes and Filtering Theory, Academic
Press, New York, 1970.
(38) Chow, E.Y., 'Analytic Studies of the Generalized Likelihood Ratio
Technique for Failure Detection', S.M. Thesis, Dept. of Elec. Engr. and
Computer Sci., M.I.T., Feb. 1976.
(39) Bueno, R.A., 'Performance and Sensitivity Analysis of the GLR Method
for Failure Detection', S.M. Thesis, Dept. of Elec. Engr. and Comp.
Sci., M.I.T., Feb. 1977.
(40) Deyst, J.J., Jr., and A.L. Hpkins, Jr., 'Highly Survivable Integrated
Avionics', Astronautics and Aeronautics, pp. 30-41, Sept. 1978
(41) Hopkins, A.L., Jr., T.B. Smith, III, and J.H. Lala, 'FTMP-A Highly
Reliable Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor for Aircraft', Proc. of
the IEEE., Vol. 66, No. 10, Oct. 1978.
(42) Van Loan, C.F., "Computing Integrals Involving the Matrix Exponential',
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-23, No. 3, June 1978.
-223-
